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IMPROVING THE RELIABILITY OF CRIMINAL TRIALS
THROUGHLEGALRULESTHATENCOURAGE
DEFENDANTS TO TESTIFY
Jeffrey Bellin"

Reflecting a traditional bias against defendants' trial testimony, the
modern American criminal justice system, which now recognizes a
constitutional right to testify at trial, unabashedly encourages
defendants to waive that right and remain silent. As a result, a large
percentage of criminal defendants decline to testify, forcing juries to
decide the question of the defendant's guilt without ever hearing from
the person most knowledgeable on the subject.
This Article contends that the inflated percentage of silent defendants
in the American criminal trial system is a needless, self-inflected wound,
neither required by the Constitution nor beneficial to the search for
truth. Consequently, the Article proposes two alternative reforms
designed to eliminate, or at least minimize, the legal inducements to
remaining silent at trial. The reforms, if adopted, would encourage a
greater number of defendants to testify (and be cross-examined),
funneling more factual information into the crucible of the adversary
process, and thereby increasing the reliability of trial outcomes.

* Senior Appellate Attorney, California Courts of Appeal; former Assistant United States
Attorney; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1999.
Readers may contact the author at
Jeffrey.Bellin@gmail.com

851

HeinOnline -- 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 851 2007-2008

852

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

Introduction .......................................................................................... 852
I. The Value of Hearing From the Defendant at Trial.. ........................ 854
II. A Tale of Two Rights: The Right to Testify and The Right Not
to Testify .................................................................................... 859
A. The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Testify .................. 860
B. The Defendant's Constitutional Right Not to Testify ........... 862
III. Unequal Rights: Burdens on Defendant Testimony and Rewards
for Defendant Silence ................................................................ 863
A. Impeachment With Prior Convictions .................................. 863
B. Cross-Examination With Otherwise Inadmissible
Evidence ............................................................................. 868
C. Trial Courts and Prosecutors May Not Comment
Adversely on a Defendant's Refusal to Testify .................. 872
D. A Prosecutor May Comment on a Testifying Defendant's
"Opportunity" to Tailor Testimony .................................... 873
E. Favorable Jury Instructions For Silent Defendants ............... 875
F. Adverse Instructions Regarding Defendant Testimony ........ 876
G. Increased Penalties For Testifying Defendants .................... 877
IV. An Alternative Incentive Scheme .................................................. 880
A. Reform Alternative No. 1: Alter the Existing Framework ... 882
B. Reform Alternative No. 2: Bargaining Around the Default
Framework Through In Limine Motions ............................ 890
Conclusion ........................................................................................... 896
INTRODUCTION

Although the exact numbers vary by jurisdiction, studies reveal that
up to half of all criminal defendants who proceed to trial elect not to
testify on their own behalf, and that this percentage has been increasing
since at least the early twentieth century. 1 One reason defendants
decline to testify is that over the past two centuries, the courts have
constructed an elaborate jurisprudence vigorously protecting the right

I. Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the innocent: A Close Look at a New
Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REv. 925, 950-51 (2002) (summarizing studies dating back to
the 1920s and concluding that "with increasing frequency defendants are not taking the stand at trial as
they once did" and "the extent of refusals to testify varies from one-third to well over one-half [of
defendants] in some jurisdictions"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 311, 329-30 (1991) (describing study of trials in Philadelphia in
the 1980s that revealed that 49% of felony defendants and 57% of misdemeanor defendants chose not to
testify); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1449, 1450, 1459 (2005) (noting that "only half' of the defendants who proceed to trial testify on their
own behalf).

HeinOnline -- 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 852 2007-2008

2008]

ENCOURAGING DEFENDANT TESTIMONY

853

not to testify, and an equally elaborate jurisprudence permitting
numerous burdens to be placed on the right to testify. This case law has
no unifying legal principle, but a common practical effect-encouraging
defendants to remain silent at trial.
As there are numerous reasons why the criminal justice system should
seek to encourage defendants to testify and no clear reasons to
encourage them to remain silent, this Article proposes two alternative
reforms designed to induce defendants to "cast aside [their] cloak of
silence"2 and exercise their constitutional right to testify.
By
encouraging more defendants to testify (and be cross-examined), the
reforms would not necessarily benefit defendants or prosecutors, but can
be expected to improve the reliability of trial outcomes by maximizing
the factual information available to the jurors who must decide a
defendant's fate?
Part I of the Article illustrates the desirability of the goal of the
proposed reforms, summarizing the various benefits that would accrue to
the criminal justice system and society generally if more defendants
were to testify. Part II sketches the constitutional bounds within which
the reforms must operate, providing a background discussion of the
history of the constitutional right to testify and the right not to testify-a
history that continues to resonate through the modem patchwork of legal
rules surrounding those rights. Part III then illustrates the modern
parameters of these countervailing rights, detailing the legal rules that
have brought about the defendant-silencing status quo by severely
penalizing defendants who exercise the right to testify (e.g., by
permitting impeachment with prior convictions) and significantly
rewarding those who remain silent (e.g., by prohibiting adverse
prosecutorial comment on a defendant's trial silence). Part IV presents
two alternative reform proposals designed to alter the status quo.
The first proposal, the more obvious and direct approach to
encouraging a greater percentage of defendants to testify, would
eliminate many of the existing incentives to silence and disincentives to
testifying through a discrete set of changes to the rules governing

2. This colorful image appears in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980), which
excused the prejudicial impeachment of a testifying defendant on the ground that it "follows the
defendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence." /d.; see also Raffel v. United States, 271
U.S. 494, 497 (1926) ("[H]aving once cast aside the cloak of immunity, [a defendant] may not resume it
at will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing.").
3. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857,864,922 (1995) (arguing in a related context that "one can
simultaneously reduce both false negatives and false positives only by bringing more information into a
system" and that "[ o]ur current system throws out too much information, and in the end, this hurts both
truth-seeking prosecutors and innocent defendants").
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criminal trials. As the legal rules that would be affected by this change
currently serve little purpose other than to discourage testimony, the
reform engenders few negative collateral consequences. The second,
more modest, proposal seeks to increase the percentage of testifying
defendants within the existing criminal procedure framework through
the early identification and potential resolution of obstacles to a
defendant's testimony in a new, formally structured in limine procedure.
Both proposals seek to accomplish the goal of maximizing the
percentage of defendants who testify-and thus the facts available to the
jury-within constitutional parameters, while at the same time
minimizing any alteration of the current balance of power between the
prosecution and the defense.
I. THE VALUE OF HEARING FROM THE DEFENDANT AT TRIAL
It is difficult to perceive any legitimate criminal justice or societal
interest that is served when a defendant declines to testify at trial. There
are, however, decided disadvantages for both the criminal justice system
and society in general when the right to remain silent is invoked.
First and foremost among the disadvantages is that the reliability of
the trial process suffers. When the defendant, "who above all others
may be in a position to meet the prosecution's case,"4 is silent, the jury
is deprived of critical factual information. This deprivation increases the
danger of a verdict based on "a partial ... presentation of the facts" 5 and
at the same time impairs the related "public interest in a full and truthful
disclosure of critical facts." 6 Indeed, the Supreme Court, which bears

4. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961) ("[D]ecades ago the considered consensus of
the English-speaking world came to be that there was no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn
testimony of the accused, who above all others may be in a position to meet the prosecution's case.");
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 306 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The one person who usually
knows most about the critical facts is the accused."); Renee Lett ow Lerner, The Intersection of Two
Systems: An American on Tria/for an American Murder in the French Cour v·Assises, 2001 U.lLL. L.
REv. 791, 824-25 ("The defendant always knows information important to the fact-finder-if nothing
else, where he was at the time the crime was committed."); Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in
Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2636 (1996) ("The virtues
of an 'accusatorial' system in which defendants are privileged to remain passive are far from obvious.
The person who knows the most about the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant is ordinarily the
defendant herself. Unless expecting her to respond to inquiry is immoral or inhuman ... renouncing all
claim to her evidence is costly and foolish."); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1055 (1994) ("[The) aspiration to
capture the defendant as a testimonial resource is perfectly understandable. He is, after all, the most
efficient possible witness.").
5. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
6. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 412 (1988); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950) ("'For more than three centuries it has ... been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the
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primary responsibility for the silencing of defendants, has itself
recognized the imperative for defendant testimony, explaining:
[T]he conviction of our time [is] that the truth is more likely to be arrived
at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding
who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leavin.p
the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury....

As the Court has emphasized in other contexts, "[t]he need to develop
all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive," and "[t]he very integrity of the judicial system and
public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the
facts." 8
The decreased reliability of trial outcomes due to a partial
presentation of facts is felt most severely in cases where an innocent, or
partially innocent,9 defendant declines to testify. In such circumstances,
the jury is deprived of testimony of incomparable value-truthful
testimony from the witness most knowledgeable about the events in
question-that could prevent unjust punishment by the state, and
potentially an escape from justice by the guilty party. 10 The conviction
of innocent defendants is particularly noxious because it not only
offends any common conception of justice, but also undermines the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system causing irreparable damage to
society as a whole. 11
The loss of critical factual information when the defendant remains

public ... has a right to every man's evidence."' (quoting JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2192 (3d ed.
1940))); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 ("(E]xceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.").
7. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967)); id. at 52 ("In fact, the most important witness for the defense in many
criminal cases is the defendant himself. There is no justification today for a rule that denies an accused
the opportunity to offer his own testimony.").
8. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709, 711 (asserting that the interest in the presentation of all relevant
information at trial "has constitutional dimensions" rooted in the Sixth Amendment and "[i]t is the
manifest duty of the courts to vindicate [these constitutional] guarantees"); cf Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408
("Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.").
9. Examples of a "partially innocent" defendant include a defendant who is innocent of some
counts but not others (e.g., possessing, but not selling cocaine), or who is innocent of a greater, but not a
lesser, offense (e.g., a defendant who is guilty of manslaughter instead of murder).
10. See Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian {!?] Analysis
and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637,666 (1991) ("(S]ome of the defendants who decline
to take the stand because of the prospect of character impeachment are not in fact guilty" and in a subset
of those cases "that failure to take the stand is utterly disastrous, spelling the difference between
conviction and acquittal.").
II. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) ("The dual aim of our criminal justice
system is 'that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."' (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 ( 1935))).
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silent at trial is also felt when the testimony that is foregone is the false
testimony of a guilty defendant. This is because even false testimony,
when recognized as such, provides valuable insights.
A premise of the American jury system is that false testimony will be
exposed when subjected to the "crucible" of the adversary process. 12
This premise is particularly forceful in the case of a defendant's
testimony, which will be tested by cross-examination and the
presentation of rebuttal evidence by a prosecutor possessing
investigatory resources limited only by the prosecuting agency's
estimation of the significance of the case. It is to be expected, then, that
in the vast run of cases, a defendant's false testimony will be exposed or
at least significantly undermined and, as a consequence, the search for
truth will not be obscured by a lying defendant's perjury, but rather
enlightened by the defendant's unintentional disclosure of a
consciousness of guilt. 13
In the case of both the innocent and guilty defendant, the defendant's
testimony also invariably helps to focus the trier of fact on the key issues
in dispute. Without the testimony of the defendant, the defense strategy
generally devolves into an effort to discredit any and all aspects of the
prosecution's case, asserting generically that the prosecution has not
12. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983) ("[T]he truthfinding process is better served if
the witness' testimony is submitted to 'the crucible of the judicial process so that the factfinder may
consider it, after cross-examination, together with the other evidence in the case to determine where the
truth lies."' (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 440 (1976) (White, J. concurring in
judgment))); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (stating that the Constitution "commands,
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination"); Great Coastal Exp., Inc. v. lnt'l Broth. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349,
1357 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Peijury and fabricated evidence are evils that can and should be exposed at trial,
and the legal system encourages and expects litigants to root them out as early as possible."); cf
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (describing cross-examination as the '"greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"' (quoting 5 WIGMORE§ 1367)).
13. See Miijan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 528 (1973) (explaining that continental
European systems encourage defendant testimony even though it is often false, because "[i]t is believed
that precious information can be obtained even from false denials of guilt, detected inconsistencies, and
other verbal or non-verbal expressions emanating from the defendant's person"); Lerner, supra note 4, at
827 ("A defendant need not be truthful to reveal a great deal, as all detectives know."); Amar & Lettow,
supra note 3, at 864, 903 (recognizing value of a lying witness in related context because the witness
"may well sound unconvincing or trip himself up with inconsistent testimony," and will "be subject to
impeachment via cross-examination and ... introduction of other evidence and witnesses" leaving "[t]he
jury ... perfectly poised to assess witness credibility and to resolve factual disputes" which, "of course,
is what we pay jurors to do"); Langbein, supra note 4, at I053 (recounting view of 18th century
commentator, Seijeant William Hawkins, on the virtue of defendant's testimony that even '"[i]f the
defendant is guilty"' the testimony '"may often help to disclose the Truth, which probably would not so
well be discovered from the artificial Defense of others speaking for them"'); id. (recounting response to
Hawkins that '"Hawkins' message is that it is desirable for the accused to speak, either to clear himself
or to hang himself").
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carried its burden of proof. Both the prosecution's presentation and the
jury's deliberations then must presume every material fact to be in
dispute, hindering the jury's ability to focus its deliberative energy on
the critical issues in the case. When a defendant testifies, however,
certain factual aspects of the case will likely be conceded so that the
defendant can construct a logical narrative of his actions. This will
allow the jury to focus on the actual areas of factual dispute between the
prosecution's and the defendant's narratives. In such a circumstance,
even if the defendant lies about some material facts--e.g., "I was there,
but did not pull the trigger"-the jury has received valuable information
--e.g., "I was there"-and can focus its deliberations accordingly,
improving the likelihood of a reliable outcome. 14
In addition to increasing the reliability of trial outcomes, maximizing
the percentage of defendants who testify would also strengthen the
perception of fairness, and thus perceived legitimacy, of the criminal
justice system. A system in which a large percentage of criminal
defendants are charged, tried, and either convicted or acquitted-a series
of events that for many defendants will be defining moments in their
lives-without ever speaking on their own behalf has been aptly
described as a "massive democratic and human failure." 15 Whatever one
thinks about the value of a criminal defendant's speech in particular
cases, it cannot be denied that viewed from a defendant's perspective, a
system that accuses, judges, and, in some cases, even punishes without
ever hearing from the accused appears unfair and dictatoria1. 16 The fine
distinction that the defendant may have technically had an opportunity to
testify is likely of little comfort in the confines of a prison cell. In no
other context, from the termination of an employee to the informal
punishment of misbehaving children, would it be considered just to mete
out punishment without hearing from the accused. 17 In the American

14. For example, in a murder prosecution the prosecution may attempt to establish that (i) the
defendant knew the victim; (ii) wanted him dead; (iii) owned a gun; (iv) was present at the time of the
murder; (v) shot the victim; and (vi) did so without legal justification. If the defense is simply that the
prosecution has not met its burden, the jury must puzzle over each of these factual questions, and its
diffuse focus may result in a mistaken outcome. If the defendant testifies, however, he will likely
concede some of the points, for example that he knew the victim and was with him when he died, and
contend only that another person pulled the trigger; the jury may accept those concessions and refocus
its energies accordingly.
15. Natapoff, supra note I, at 1449. Of course an even larger percentage of defendants waive
their right to testify by pleading guilty.
16. Natapoff, supra note I, at 1450 (recognizing that "some defendants do not even speak at their
own sentencings"); cf Lerner, supra note 4, at 825 (stating that active participation in French criminal
trials often aids defendants because "even if the defendant does not outright confess, describing his
thoughts or actions might in some cases make him appear more sympathetic or at least understandable").
17. /d. at 825 ("In everyday life, our methods of finding out the truth normally include talking
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criminal justice system, this fairly common occurrence of rendering
judgment without an account from the accused is countenanced and even
celebrated as "a victory for defendants." 18
There is also a third interest that suffers when a substantial percentage
of defendants never voice their perspective on the events that led them to
court: the interest of the criminal justice system in developing an
accurate perception of its street-level effects. Criminal practitioners,
judges, and lawmakers are constantly striving to fine tune the workings
of the criminal justice system. These efforts would benefit from the
voices of defendants who (along with crime victims) are the primary
"consumers" of that system. By encouraging defendants to remain silent
throughout the process, the system suffers an "institutional loss of
information about defendant perceptions and experiences" that decreases
any potential recognition of what works, what does not work, and what
should be changed. 19 Society, as represented by the thousands of jurors
who move through the criminal justice system each day, would also
benefit from hearing defendants' stories in order to better understand
how various policies, e.g., "the war on drugs," are being implemented.
In this sense, opening the door to more defendants' voices could provide
untold advantages in terms of future political and legal reforms.
In contrast to these clear advantages of defendant testimony, there
appear to be few, if any, valid reasons to discourage such testimony. 20

with a suspected person to hear his side of the story."); cf Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2637 ("Criminal
cases aside, there are apparently no investigative or fact·finding proceedings in which asking questions
and expecting answers is regarded as dirty business."); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332
(1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) {"If I ask my son whether he saw a movie I had forbidden him to watch,
and he remains silent, the import of his silence is clear.").
While defendants are permitted to speak on their own behalf at sentencing, the defendant's
right to allocute at sentencing is generally displaced by a mixed legal and factual presentation of defense
counsel, who often discourage lengthy client statements that could interfere with this presentationpromoting instead, "either complete silence or a truncated, inauthentic version of the defendant's
feelings about the case." Natapoff, supra note I, at 1466, 1468.
18. Natapoff, supra note I, at 1450-51, 1493-95 (noting that "[c]ourts and scholars typically
treat" the silencing of defendants "as a victory for defendants" but that "[ d]efendants who remain silent
throughout the legal process are less likely to understand their own cases, engage the dictates of the law
intellectually, accept the legitimacy of the outcomes, feel remorse, or change as a result of the
experience'}
19. See id. at 1457, 1487 ("Criminal defendants are excluded from the 'marketplace of ideas' that
shapes the criminal justice system."). An additional disadvantage of a system that celebrates defendant
silence is that it undermines the civic ideal of cooperation with authorities. See R. Kent Greenawalt,
Silence As a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 15, 49-50 (1981) (arguing that
the symbol of silence in the face of authority while favorable in some respects has a "harmful side" in
that it "may weaken the sense that obedience to law is something more than the bad man's calculation of
most likely advantage").
20. The primary argument for broadly encouraging trial silence is that such silence protects not
only the irrefutably guilty, but also a subset of innocent defendants whose low sophistication and
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In fact, the primary beneficiaries of a legal system that discourages
defendant testimony is a small subset of guilty defendants who, because
they have no plausible defense, would not testify under any legal
regime. By providing numerous tactical advantages to defendants who
remain silent that have little to do with guilt or innocence, the current
system primarily aids the cause of these hopelessly guilty defendants by
lending credence to the belief that even innocent defendants remain
silent at trial.
II. A TALE OF Two RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND THE RIGHT NOT
TO TESTIFY

One of the most surprising aspects of the American criminal justice
system's essentially punitive patchwork of rules governing defendant
testimony is how little of the current system is dictated by its
constitutional or historical roots. To highlight the degree to which
modem jurisprudence has strayed from those roots, and simultaneously
to sketch the constitutional parameters of the defendant's decision to
testify or remain silent, this Part briefly summarizes the history of the
two countervailing rights at issue.

personal mannerisms are such that even armed with the truth, they will appear guilty under the skilled
questioning of a prosecutor. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 n.IS (1981) (recognizing
"' [e]xcessive timidity'" and "'nervousness when facing others"' as traits potentially likely to betray an
innocent defendant who takes the stand (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893)));
Schulhofer, supra note I, at 330 (arguing that some innocent defendants may be better off not testifying
because, inter alia, they "may look sleazy" have a "vague memory" of events or be "inarticulate,
nervous or easily intimidated"); Amar & Lettow, supra note 3, at 922-23 ("[E]ven a good lawyer cannot
always save an innocent but unpersuasive-sounding client from being demolished on the stand."). This
narrative of innocent, but overly anxious, defendants who must be protected from their own testimony is
unpersuasive for at least three reasons . First, the suggestion that truthful testimony should be
discouraged because it may be disbelieved is overbroad as it applies to every witness, not just
defendants. It is thought, however, that generally applicable trial rules, such as limits on crossexamination (the attorney sponsoring the witness may object to irrelevant, argumentative questions, etc.)
overseen by a neutral judge, and allowing the sponsoring attorney to clarify witness testimony on
redirect examination, obviate this problem; if this process works for witnesses generally, there is no
reason to believe it would not work for defendants. Second, this justification for trial silence ignores
that lay jurors, no doubt having just experienced some form of "stage-fright" during voir dire, are fully
equipped to understand such factors as a particular defendant's relative lack of sophistication or
nervousness when placed on trial, and these concerns can be fully brought out by defense counsel on
direct examination. Third, as with a significant witness in any case, competent counsel should be
expected to prepare a defendant for cross-examination in advance of trial (and to seek out corroboration
for the defendant's testimony), decreasing the likelihood that a defendant who speaks the truth will be
made to appear guilty by virtue of prosecutorial questioning. See also infra note 130 (suggesting ways
to mitigate prejudice that might result when a defendant declines to testify for reasons other than guilt of
the charged crime).
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A. The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Testify

In the American courts as they existed at the time of the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, and in the decades that followed, the question of the
proper incentives and disincentives to apply to a criminal defendant's
testimony was resolved by the simple, elegant, and, as it turns out,
unconstitutional solution of prohibiting any sworn testimony by the
accused. Defendants at the end of the eighteenth century were not faced
with anything approximating the contemporary dilemma of whether or
not to testify because they were simply "disqualified from testifying
under oath."21
As recent scholarship has demonstrated, however, this prohibition of
sworn testimony presents a somewhat incomplete picture of trials of the
period. In truth, a defendant's sworn testimony would have been
somewhat redundant in late eighteenth century trials. Defendants were
expected to provide a "pretrial statement" to a justice of the peace
detailing their account of the events in question, and "typically spoke
and conducted their defense personally, without counsel," invariably
presenting "their story" to the jurors. 22 Thus, while defendants were
forbidden the right to testify, the courts of the time were not so foolhardy
as to deprive themselves of any useful factual information a defendant
might provide. 23 Indeed, while defendants' sworn testimony was
prohibited, their unsworn statements were practically compelled.
Usually deprived of counsel and subject to having the pretrial statement
(or lack thereof) referred to at trial, a defendant's "refusal to respond"
through unsworn statements to incriminating charges "would have been
suicidal. "24
21. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61,66 (2000) (observing that at time of the adoption of the Bill
of Rights, "what [defendants] said at trial was not considered to be evidence, since they were
disqualified from testifying under oath"); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971) ("(A]t the
time of framing of the Fifth Amendment and for many years thereafter the accused in criminal cases was
not allowed to testify in his own behalf."); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) ("The right of an
accused to testify in his defense is of relatively recent origin. Until the latter part of the preceding
century, criminal defendants in this country, as at common law, were considered to be disqualified from
giving sworn testimony at their own trial by reason of their interest as a party to the case.").
22. Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 66; see generally Langbein, supra note 4; Alschuler, supra note 4.
23. Cf Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-28 (1956) ("The Founders of the Nation
were not naive or disregardful of the interests of justice."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961)
("There is no war between the Constitution and common sense.").
24. Langbein, supra note 4, at I 048-49 ("Undergirding the criminal procedure of the early
modem trial at common law was a set of rules and practices whose purpose and effect were to oblige the
accused to respond to the charges against him."); Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2631 ("Until the nineteenth
century was well underway, magistrates and judges in ... America expected and encouraged suspects
and defendants to speak during pretrial interrogation and again at trial. Fact finders did not hesitate to
draw inferences of guilt when defendants remained silent. The informal inducements of prenineteenth
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In the latter part of the nineteenth century, this procedural landscape
was altered by the enactment of statutes permitting defendants to give
sworn testimony in federal court and state courts, excepting only
Georgia. 25 The reformers who spearheaded this change did not
necessarily intend to assist criminal defendants; in fact, one of the
leading advocates for reform argued that defendants' incompetence to
testify had "served the guilty as a shield" from cross-examination "and
thus disserved the public interest." 26 Conversely, the greater part of
those opposing the reform believed allowing defendants to testify under
oath "threatened erosion of the privilege against self-incrimination and
the presumption of innocence."27
The proponents of reform, of course, carried the day and, indeed, the
century as the law regarding defendants' testimony was turned upside
down, and it became "the considered consensus of the English-speaking
world" that "there was no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn
testimony of the accused." 28 Bowing to this consensus, the Supreme
Court gradually enshrined the opportunity to testify under oath with
century trial procedure were, moreover, great enough that virtually every defendant did speak.");
Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 66 ("Defendants [at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights] routinely were
asked (and agreed) to provide a pretrial statement to a justice of the peace detailing the events in
dispute. . . . If their story at trial-where they typically spoke and conducted their defense personally,
without counsel-differed from their pretrial statement, the contradiction could be noted." (internal
citations omitted)); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 333 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
justice of the peace testified at trial as to the content of the· defendant's (pre-trial] statement; if the
defendant refused to speak, this would also have been reported to the jury.").
25. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 (1961) ("Before the end of the century every State
except Georgia had abolished the disqualification."); Nix, 475 U.S. at 164 ("By the end of the 19th
century . . . the disqualification was finally abolished by statute in most states and in the federal
courts."). A federal statute permitting defendants to give sworn testimony was enacted in 1878. See 18
U.S.C. § 3481 (2000) ("In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the
United States ... the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to
make such request shall not create any presumption against him.").
With the advent of these reforms and the more frequent participation of defense counsel in
criminal trials, the pretrial statement gradually fell into disuse. See Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 66 ("The
pretrial statement did not begin to fall into disuse until the 1830's .... "); cf Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 586
("'The system of allowing a prisoner to make a statement had been introduced as a mere makeshift, by
way of mitigating the intolerable hardship which occasionally resulted from the prisoner not being able
to speak on his own behalf."').
26. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577, 580 (describing position of John Appleton, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Maine and disciple of Jeremy Bentham, who spearheaded the reform in Maine leading
to the first statute "in the English-speaking world" permitting criminal defendant testimony).
27. !d. at 578. In the wake of this reform, many who had opposed it on this ground came to
rethink their views, accepting that "innocence was in fact aided, not prejudiced, by the opportunity of
the accused to testify under oath." !d. at 580-81.
28. !d. at 582; Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1895) ("The old law was that
interest debarred one from testifying, for fear that such interest might tend to a perversion of the truth.
A more enlightened spirit has thrown down this barrier, and now mere interest does not exclude one
from the witness stand, but the interest is to be considered as affecting his credibility.").
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constitutional status, finally holding in 1987 that "[t]he right to testify on
one's own behalf at a criminal trial," while not explicitly referenced in
the constitutional text, is guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 29
B. The Defendant's Constitutional Right Not to Testify

A defendant's right not to testify has a more distinguished pedigree
than its younger relation the right to testify, beginning with its firm
textual source in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution that
commands that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself." 30 The right also has deep historical roots,
representing a tangible result of the political abuses America's founders
fought to eliminate. 31
The right to remain silent in the face of accusation has been widely
celebrated in American law, representing in the words of the Supreme
Court "an important advance in the development of our liberty" and
'"one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized. "'32 As famously stated, the right, among other things, protects
the guilty defendant from "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury
or contempt," by allowing the guilty to sit silently while "'requiring the
government ... to shoulder the entire load"' of a criminal prosecution. 33

29. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,49-51 (1987) (ruling that "[a]t this point in the development
of our adversary system, it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the
witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense," while noting that this was "a change from the
historic common-law view, which was that all parties to litigation, including criminal defendants, were
disqualified from testifying because of their interest in the outcome of the trial"). Although the Court
had repeatedly assumed or hinted that a defendant had a constitutional right to testify prior to the
decision in Rock, see, e.g., Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 582, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,225 (1971), it
had not explicitly held that there was such a right or designated its source in the Constitution. See Nix,
475 U.S. at 164 (noting in 1986 that Court had "never explicitly held" the right existed, although it had
"suggested" its existence); see also United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993) ("The right to
testify on one's own behalf in a criminal proceeding is ... a right implicit in the Constitution.") (citing
Rock and Nix); Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2664.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,55 (1964).
31. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896) ("So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient
system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states, with one accord,
made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a
maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the
impregnability of a constitutional enactment.").
32. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-28 (1956); Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 .
33. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 . The Supreme Court's celebratory statements, which have been
relied upon to promote an expansive interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, have been critiqued by
numerous observers as essentially sloganeering. See, e.g., Henry 1. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. C!N. L. REV. 671, 682-695 (1968) (critiquing the
rationales provided by the Supreme Court and others to support an expansive Fifth Amendment
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The Court has emphasized that the values protected by the right not to
testify are so important that they easily overcome the fact that it may on
occasion "save a guilty man from his just des[ s]erts. " 34
At least with respect to the defendant's testimony at trial, the
implications of the Fifth Amendment right have long been clear: "The
freedom of a defendant in a criminal trial to remain silent 'unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will' is guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment and made applicable to state criminal
proceedings through the Fourteenth."35
Ill. UNEQUAL RIGHTS: BURDENS ON DEFENDANT TESTIMONY AND
REwARDS FOR DEFENDANT SILENCE

Although both the right to testify and the right to remain silent at trial
share nominally equivalent status as constitutional rights, the two rights
have not been treated equally. The Supreme Court has permitted severe
burdens to be placed on the right to testify, while prohibiting the
placement of equivalent burdens on the right to remain silent at trial. 36
In light of the complex and unequal treatment of the two rights,
criminal defendants are now faced with a dizzying array of legal rules
that shape the already complicated tactical calculus of whether or not to
testify. As detailed below, in evaluating the implications of these rules,
a properly advised defendant who wishes to testify must consider not
only the numerous legal burdens that attach should he do so, but also the
many court-created benefits of remaining silent that will be foregone.
A. Impeachment With Prior Convictions
The most widely recognized and stark disincentive to taking the
witness stand is that if, and in most cases only if, a defendant testifies,
the prosecution can then inform the jury of the defendant's prior
criminal convictions. 37 While often viewed solely as a product of the

jurisprudence as "mere rhetoric," "largely conclusory," and, in sum, a "rather slender basis" for thenexisting doctrine); Amar & Lettow, supra note 3, at 892 (characterizing analgous arguments in favor of
expansive Fifth Amendment jurisprudence as "more like slogans that merely restate the rule than
considered rationales").
34. Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 426-28.
35. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 8
(1964)).
36. See Natapoff, supra note I, at 1483 ("[T]he Court's protection of the defendant's right to
speak is markedly weaker than its protection of the right to remain silent.").
37. See FED. R. EVID. 609; United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 183-84(4th Cir. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) ("[T]here are many reasons unrelated to guilt that may
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rule permitting credibility impeachment with prior convictions-Federal
Rule of Evidence 60938-this disincentive to testifying is, in fact, the
product of two separate rules, one favoring defendants and the other
favoring the prosecution. 39
The rule favoring defendants is that if the defendant elects not to
testify, evidence of previous malfeasance, including prior convictions, is
generally inadmissible. More specifically, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith."40 This rule represents a defendant-friendly
policy determination that precludes admission of prior crimes as
As the Supreme Court has
substantive, propensity evidence. 41
explained, the inquiry into propensity "is not rejected because character
is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury
and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge. "42
Absent the policy-based prohibition contained in Rule 404, evidence
of criminal convictions would presumably be admissible to prove that a
defendant with a criminal record committed a subsequent charged crime
whether or not the defendant testified at trial. 43 Under such a regime,

militate against testifying. Chief among these is the prosecution's power to impeach the defendant's
credibility with prior convictions under Fed. R. Evid. 609.").
38. While this Article examines the problem of defendant trial silence primarily through analysis
of the federal criminal trial system, the discussion would be essentially identical with respect to criminal
trials in state courts as those courts are bound by the constitutional rulings of the federal Supreme Court
discussed herein and employ statutory rules of evidence and procedure that, with a handful of
exceptions, are substantially similar to the federal rules. See Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial
Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries Of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 884, n.36
(2008) (noting that "[f]orty-two states have adopted rules of evidence patterned on the Federal Rules").
39. See United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Two conflicting rules of
evidence are responsible for this situation. The first is that a prior criminal conviction is irrelevant to
prove whether or not defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Such evidence is therefore initially
inadmissible. The other rule is that the credibility of any witness may be impeached by evidence of his
prior criminal convictions. The evidence is therefore admissible, after the witness testifies. The conflict
between these two rules thrusts the defendant onto the horns of a dilemma.").
40. FED. R. Evm. 404(b); see also FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion .... ").
41. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
860 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the "[r]ules of evidence are ... weighted in the
defendant's favor" and giving as an example that "the prosecution generally cannot introduce evidence
of the defendant's character to prove his propensity to commit a crime, but the defendant can introduce
such reputation evidence to show his law-abiding nature").
42. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76.
43. If the protections of Rule 404 were eliminated, the Supreme Court might then preclude such
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the potential that a defendant would be impeached with prior convictions
would, of course, have no bearing on the decision whether or not to
testify. 44 Given the general prohibition of evidence of a defendant's
prior convictions as substantive evidence, however, a rule permitting the
use of that evidence to impeach a testifying defendant assumes great
significance in deterring even innocent defendants from testifying. 45
Although criticized for decades by commentators, 46 the practice of
impeaching testifying defendants with prior convictions has long been
propensity evidence on constitutional grounds. To date, the Supreme Court has declined to reach this
question. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) (declining to decide "whether a state law
would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of 'prior crimes' evidence to show
propensity to commit a charged crime"); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 572-75 (1967), (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting and concurring) ("While this Court has never held that the use of prior convictions to show
nothing more than a disposition to commit crime would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, our decisions exercising supervisory power over criminal trials in federal
courts, as well as decisions by courts of appeals and of state courts, suggest that evidence of prior crimes
introduced for no purpose other than to show criminal disposition would violate the Due Process
Clause."); McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that rule prohibiting
adverse character evidence is so "historically grounded" as to be constitutionally based). A recent
development that signals the absence of a constitutional prohibition on such propensity evidence is the
federal appellate courts' upholding of the constitutionality of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414,
which allow evidence of the defendant's prior commission of rape and sexual assault (Rule 413), and
child molestation (Rule 414) to be used as propensity evidence in a subsequent prosecution for those
offenses. See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing cases).
44. Lerner, supra note 4, at 824 (noting the fact that a defendant's criminal record is considered
in the French criminal justice system regardless of whether the defendant testifies as one of the
"incentives" in that system for the defendant to testify).
45. See, e.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 n.l5 (1981) (noting that "fear of
impeachment by prior convictions (the petitioner's fear in the present case)'' dissuades defendants from
testifying); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) ("'Defendant contends that the reason a
defendant refuses to testify is that his prior convictions will be introduced in evidence to impeach him
and not that he is unable to deny the accusations. It is true that the defendant might fear that his prior
convictions will prejudice the jury, and therefore another possible inference can be drawn from his
refusal to take the stand."' (quoting People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 763 (Cal. 1965)) (internal citation
omitted)).
46. See, e.g., Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to TestifY and
Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. I, 62--63 ( 1997) (contending that impeachment by
prior convictions places an intolerable burden on the right to testify); Friedman, supra note I0, at 678
(arguing that impeachment of defendants with prior convictions should be precluded because
"[ c]haracter impeachment evidence of an accused has virtually no probative value with respect to
credibility, but its availability has tremendous prejudicial impact"); Robert D. Dodson, What Went
Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction
Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. I, 51 (1999) (endorsing "a per se rule disallowing prior conviction
evidence"); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice
in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 868 (1982) (suggesting that "the impeachment rubric is a
hoax, merely a cover for the admission of evidence bearing on propensity-which is what the rule's
defenders are probably seeking"); Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 58 (arguing that "innocent defendants in
many American jurisdictions are deterred from testifying by the unjust practice of allowing prior
convictions to be routinely admitted to impeach a defendant's credibility"); cf Spencer v. Texas, 385
U.S. 554, 577 ( 1967) (recognizing that "the theory justifying admission of evidence of prior convictions
to impeach a defendant's credibility has been criticized").
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accepted by the courts and is now firmly entrenched in the Federal Rules
of Evidence.47 Rule 609 permits impeachment of the credibility of all
witnesses, including criminal defendants, with convictions for crimes
that involve so-called crimen falsi, "proof or admission of an act of
dishonesty or false statement," as well as convictions for all crimes
punishable by more than one year in prison.48 With respect to this
second category--essentially all felonies-the Rule in subsection (a)(l)
states that, for purposes of impeaching a testifying defendant, such
convictions "shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused. '.49
The Supreme Court has recognized that the prospect of "crossexamination, including impeachment by prior convictions ... may deter
a defendant from taking the stand," 50 but has nonetheless concluded that
the practice does not create an unconstitutional burden on the right to
testify. 51 It bases this conclusion on a rough equality of witnesses
47. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 757 (2000) ("[O]nce the defendant testifies, she is
subject to cross-examination, including impeachment by prior convictions . . . ."); McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971) ("It is also generally recognized that a defendant who takes the
stand in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or the like."); United States v.
Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 215-16 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Although firmly entrenched in criminal justice
procedures, the admission of prior conviction evidence to impeach the defendant's credibility has been
persistently criticized in recent years .... "; "Regardless of any criticism, the use of prior conviction
evidence to impeach credibility is generally accepted as fair and proper.").
48. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
49. !d. at 609(a)(l). Under this Rule, impeachment of a testifying defendant with his prior
convictions has become relatively routine practice. See Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 58 (arguing that
prior convictions are now "routinely admitted to impeach a defendant's credibility"); Ed Gainor,
Character Evidence by Any Other Name ... : A Proposal to Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction
Under Rule 609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 762, 767, 780 (1990) (contending that "many courts have
tended to admit virtually any prior felony for impeachment on the basis that the defendant's credibility is
in issue-as, indeed, it virtually always will be, if the defendant denies the charges against him"; and
that "[f]ederal courts of appeals have rarely reversed a trial judge's decision to admit evidence of prior
convictions for impeachment"); see 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 6134 (1993) (emphasizing that in most cases, where trial courts "at least
claimed" to have "considered both probative value and prejudice" the "appellate courts usually defer to
the decision of the trial court if there is any way to rationalize the balance struck"); Jeffrey Bellin, How
the Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42
U.C. DAVIS LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2008) (critiquing federal.courts.' jurisprudence under Rule
609(a)(l)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=ll31742.
50. Ohler, 529 U.S. at 757, 759-60; see also Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 609 (1972)
("[A] defendant's choice to take the stand carries with it serious risks of impeachment and crossexamination.").
51. See Ohler, 529 U.S. at 757, 759-60 ("It is not thought overly harsh in such situations to
require that the determination whether to waive the privilege take into account the matters which may be
brought out on cross-examination. It is also generally recognized that a defendant who takes the stand in
his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or the like .... Again, it is not thought
inconsistent with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh
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principle that celebrates "treating testifying defendants the same as other
witnesses."52 In applying this principle, the Court appears unconcerned
that defendants are unlike any other witnesses in a number of respects,
including that they possess a constitutional right to testify and are
singularly prejudiced by the ready susceptibility of prior conviction
impeachment to improper use as propensity evidence. 53
While the efficacy and fairness of impeachment with prior
convictions is a subject of much debate, what cannot be denied is that
allowing most prior convictions to be used solely to impeach a testifying
defendant creates a powerful incentive for defendants, both innocent and
guilty, to remain silent. 54 In essence, defendants with a criminal record

such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify." (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215
(1971))); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,213 (1971) ("It does no violence to the privilege that a
person's choice to testify in his own behalf may open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence,"
including prior convictions). The Supreme Court of Hawaii holds a contrary view and has ruled that "to
convict a criminal defendant where prior crimes have been introduced to impeach his credibility as a
witness violates the accused's constitutional right to testify in his own defense." State v. Santiago, 492
P.2d 657,661 (Haw. 1971). A handful of states have adopted Hawaii's approach in generally barring
impeachment of testifying defendants with prior convictions. See Dodson, supra note 46, at 51 (citing
Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Georgia, and Montana as the sole jurisdictions that depart from the
federal rule generally permitting such impeachment).
52. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 73 (2000); id. at 69, 73 (noting that "[w]ith respect to
issues of credibility," defendants are treated "the same as other witnesses"); see also Brown v. United
States, 356 U.S. 148, 155 (1958) ("If [a defendant] takes the stand and testifies in his own defense his
credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness . . . .");
Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900) ("[W]e know of no reason why an accused person
who takes the stand as a witness should not be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses are.");
Reagan v. United States, !57 U.S. 301, 305 (1895) (if the defendant chooses to "avail himself of this
privilege [to testify], his credibility may be impeached, his testimony may be assailed, and is to be
weighed as that of any other witness. Assuming the position of a witness, he is entitled to all its rights
and protections, and is subject to all its criticisms and burdens .... His credibility may be impeached,
and by the same methods as are pursued in the case of any other witness.").
53. See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482 n.ll (1972) ('"The sharpest and most prejudicial
impact of the practice of impeachment by conviction ... is upon one particular type of witness, namely,
the accused in a criminal case who elects to take the stand."' (quoting C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE§ 43,
at 93 (1954))); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 289 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority
for "lumping together of defendants with all other witnesses" because "it ignores the pivotal fact that the
Sixth Amendment accords defendants constitutional rights above and beyond those accorded witnesses
generally"); Pfotzer v. Aqua Sys., Inc., 162 F.2d 779, 785 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned Hand, J.) ("[S]o far as
we can see, the greater number of jurisdictions allow the conviction as evidence to impeach a
witness .... Whether the attempt is ever practicable to limit its use to the witness's credibility, and
whether, if not, its use is an injustice, are not open questions for us."); FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(l)
(requiring district courts to consider admission of conviction under a more rigorous standard when
conviction is that of the accused than for any other trial witnesses).
54. Adding to the burden Rule 609 places on defendant testimony, the Supreme Court has
diminished a tactical advantage normally available in these circumstances-the practice of eliminating
"the sting" of prior conviction evidence by bringing that evidence in on direct examination-by ruling
that when the defense engages in this practice, it forfeits any ability to later challenge the trial court's
ruling permitting the impeachment. Ohler, 529 U.S. at 759-{;0.
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must choose between their constitutional right to testify and their
statutory right to keep prior convictions from coming before the jury. 55

B. Cross-Examination With Otherwise Inadmissible Evidence
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, defendants considering
whether or not to take the witness stand must ponder not only the likely
impact of their testimony on direct examination, but also the impact of
cross-examination. This is because "[ o]nee a defendant takes the stand,
he is 'subject to cross-examination impeaching his credibility just like
any other witness.'"56 Thus, when a '"defendant places himself at the
very heart of the trial process'" 57 by testifying, the prosecutor will test
the defendant's statements through cross-examination, a process
famously described as the "'greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth. "'58 Cross-examination, of course, does not stop with
impeachment by prior convictions, and includes as well a vigorous
rhetorical challenge to any perceived inconsistencies or inaccuracies in
55. See State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 660 (Haw. 1971) (recognizing that permitting
impeachment with prior convictions, "puts the criminal defendant who has prior convictions in a
tremendous dilemma" and "(a]ny defendant who has prior convictions will therefore feel constrained not
to take the stand"); United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasizing that the
potential of impeachment with prior convictions if the defendant testifies "thrusts the defendant onto the
horns of a dilemma"); Hornstein, supra note 46, at 62--{;3 ("[P]ermitting impeachment by prior
conviction is likely to deprive the jury of whatever evidence a defendant might offer on the question of
guilt or innocence by compelling the defendant to 'waive' the constitutional right to testify on pain of
suffering the prejudice of having the jury learn of his or her criminal past."). That this tradeoff is
permitted demonstrates the disfavored status of the right to testify. The Supreme Court would surely
never permit the opposite situation-where prior convictions would be admissible only if the defendant
did not testify, as this would constitute too great a burden on the right to remain silent. See Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) (accused must be permitted to "remain silent 'unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will'" (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 8 (I 964))).
56. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 70 (2000) (quoting Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,
235-36 (1980)). A witness "may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination when questioned about the details." Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314,
321 ( 1999); Brown, 356 U.S. at 155-56 (recognizing that a witness "'has no right to set forth to the jury
all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those
facts '" and that this rule applies "to a witness in any proceeding who voluntarily takes the stand and
offers testimony in his own behalf' (quoting Fitzpatrick, 178 U.S. at 315)); Fitzpatrick, 178 U.S. at 315
("Where an accused party waives his constitutional privilege of silence, takes the stand in his own behalf
and makes his own statement, it is clear that the prosecution has a right to cross-examine upon such
statement with the same latitude as would be exercised in the case of an ordinary witness, as to the
circumstances connecting him with the alleged crime.").
57. Perry, 488 U.S. at 283 (holding that trial court could instruct defendant not to consult with
his counsel during recess in testimony because "'[o]nce the defendant places himself at the very heart of
the trial process, it only comports with basic fairness that the story presented on direct is measured for
its accuracy and completeness by uninfluenced testimony on cross-examination'" (quoting United States
v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mishler, J. concurring))).
58. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 WIGMORE§ 1367).
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the defendant's testimony.
In cross-examining the defendant, the proser.utor has the upper hand.
The testifying defendant has a transparent bias in favor of acquittal, and
the prosecutor can call upon a vast array of resources to expose any false
or misleading testimony-an effort that if successful will likely prove
disastrous to the defense cause. 59
Adding to the numerous tools available to a prosecutor for crossexamination, the Supreme Court has permitted impeachment of
testifying defendants with a wide range of evidence (in addition to prior
convictions) otherwise precluded in a criminal trial. One category of
such evidence is unlawfully obtained evidence, including: (i) statements
obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights under
Miranda v. Arizona; 60 (ii) statements obtained in violation of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel; 61 and (iii) physical
evidence seized in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. 62 This evidence, although prohibited in the prosecution's case in
chief, is generally admissible (as impeachment) on cross-examination, in
rebuttal, or both if, and only if, a defendant testifies.
The Court has recognized that these judicially crafted exceptions to
the exclusionary rules-rules that are intended to safeguard the
citizenry's constitutional rights by deterring constitutional violationsmay detract somewhat from the constitutional principles the rules are
meant to uphold. Nevertheless, the Court has held some marginal

59. See James L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: Policies,
Principles, and Politics, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1301, 1354-55 (1992) (contending that "(a]ny suggestion of
peijury in any fashion connected to the defense is powerful affirmative proof' and noting that "(c]lassic
jury instructions" invite the factfinder to use peijury, falsification of evidence and the like as evidence of
consciousness of guilt, i.e., affirmative evidence of guilt); United States v. Clark, 45 FJd 1247, 1251
(8th Cir. 1995) ("(A]dverse inferences will inevitably be drawn from disbelief of a defendant's trial
testimony .... "). One advantage the defendant does possess is surprise, in that there is generally no
requirement that the defense reveal the defendant's testimony (or even his intention to testify) in
advance. This tactical advantage has been called "practically illusory," however, in light of "the
government's broad investigatory powers" including the availability of pretrial police interrogation of
the accused and potential defense witnesses, and "the requirement in many states that the defenses of
alibi and insanity must be specially pleaded." Abraham S. Goldstein, The State And The Accused:
Balance Of Advantage In Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1192 (1960).
60. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975).
61. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990). The Supreme Court emphasizes that
impeachment is allowed because the violation is with respect to a "procedural safeguard" designed to
enforce the Sixth Amendment, not the amendment itself. /d. Similarly, "a defendant's compelled
statements, as opposed to statements taken in violation of Miranda, may not be put to any testimonial
use whatever against him in a criminal trial." New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 ( 1979).
62. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620,
627-28 (1980) (holding that even where defendant's direct examination testimony did not directly
implicate illegally seized evidence, impeachment was proper as long as the topic was "reasonably
suggested by the defendant's direct examination").
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deterrence of constitutional violations must be sacrificed to avoid
"impairment of the integrity of the factfinding goals of the criminal
trial" and the undermining of "the proper functioning of the adversary
system" that would occur if a defendant is able to testify without being
subject to all available impeachment. 63
Further eroding the desirability of testifying in particular cases, courts
have also held that the defendant's appearance on the witness stand also
triggers cross-examination with otherwise irrelevant or precluded
evidence, such as: (i) the defendant's prearrest and postarrest silence; 64
(ii) the defendant's failure to testify at a previous trial; 65 (iii) the
defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing; 66 and (iv) the

63. Havens, 446 U.S. at 627. The Supreme Court regularly uses a sword/shield analogy: "If a
defendant exercises his right to testify on his own behalf,"' he is precluded from '"tum[ing] the illegal
method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and
provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths."' Harvey, 494 U.S. at 351 (quoting
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,224 (1971)); Walder, 347 U.S. at 65. The Court has emphasized the
significance of deterring peljury to justify these rulings, explaining that "[a]ll perjured relevant
testimony is at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth," and that "a
defendant's use of [peljured] testimony [is] so antithetical to our system of justice" that the prosecution
must be "permitted ... to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to combat it." Nix v. Whiteside,
475 U.S. 157, 185 (1986) (emphasis added).
64. While the rules regarding impeachment are clear, the use of prearrest and postarrest silence
in the prosecution's case in chief is the subject of a complex and unsettled jurisprudence. Postarrest
silence is constitutionally prohibited in the prosecution's case in chief if the defendant demonstrates the
receipt of Miranda warnings. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474
U.S. 284, 295 ( 1986) (Florida prosecutor's use of defendant's postarrest post-Miranda warnings silence
as evidence of defendant's sanity violated due process). There is no clear rule with respect to prearrest
silence. See Frank S. Ward, Constitutional Law-United States v. McCann: Is the Fifth Amendment
Violated When Pre-a"est Silence Is Used as Substantive Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Guilt?, 28
AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 269, 269 (2004) ("In the absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court, the
federal circuit courts are split on when pre-arrest silence may be used 'as substantive evidence of
guilt."'). In Jenkins v. Anderson, the Court held that a defendant can be impeached with prearrest
silence, but explicitly declined to decide "whether or under what circumstances prearrest silence" could
be used in other contexts. 447 U.S. 231, 236 n.2 (1980).
65. !d. at 235; Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
66. Under Simmons v. United States, "when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to
suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against
him at trial on the issue of guilt." 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). The Court has not determined whether
such testimony may be used to impeach a testifying defendant, but this result logically follows from the
Court's other decisions, as a number of courts have recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 940
F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Beltran-Gutierrez, 19 F.3d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Quesada-Rosadal, 685 F.2d 1281, 1283 (lith Cir. 1982). An analogous line of
authority prohibits the use of a defendant's statements establishing financial eligibility for appointed
counsel to be used in the prosecution's case in chief. See United States v. Hardwell 80 F.3d 1471,
1484 (I Oth Cir. 1996) (reversing conviction where prosecution introduced defendant's financial
eligibility statements to "prove guilt at trial" and recognizing "weight of authority from other circuits"
establishing impermissibility of such use). Presumably such statements would, again, be permissible as
impeachment.
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defendant's demeanor during the trial. 67 Finally, impeachment with the
otherwise inadmissible evidence noted above has not been limited to
direct contradictions of a defendant's direct examination testimony, but
is more generally allowed whenever the subject matter that encompasses
the impeachment was "reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct
examination." 68
Thus, in addition to creating the potential for impeachment with prior
convictions, a defendant who takes the witness stand opens up the trial
to illegally seized evidence and otherwise inadmissible evidence such as
testimony at a suppression hearing and postarrest silence. Such
evidence, while ostensibly admitted solely for impeachment, carries with
it substantial risks of additional prejudice if improperly considered by
the jury as substantive evidence of guilt. These considerations, of
course, function to deter defendants from taking the witness stand by
increasing the tactical disadvantages to doing so and decreasing the
ultimate weight of any testimony a defendant offers. 69

67. See Cunningham v. Perini, 655 F.2d 98, 100 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Until a defendant has placed
his own demeanor in evidence by taking the stand to testify, his personal appearance at the trial is
irrelevant to the question of his guilt or innocence."); United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 982 (9th
Cir. 1987) (barring prosecutor from making statements regarding defendant's conduct during trial
because "fear of such statements in closing argument, will tend to eviscerate the right to remain silent by
forcing the defendant to take the stand in reaction to or in contemplation of the prosecutor's
comments").
68. Havens, 446 U.S. at 627-28 ("[A] defendant's statements made in response to proper crossexamination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination are subject to otherwise proper
impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is
inadmissible on the government's direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt."). The
holding of Havens was the final nail in the coffin of an earlier holding in Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 35 (1925), that had suggested that illegally obtained evidence could only be used to impeach a
directly contradictory statement uttered on direct examination. See Kainen, supra note 59, at 1368
(advocating "[e]liminating the impeachment exception[s] and returning to Agnello").
69. The Supreme Court, while recognizing that these rules will enter the defendant's calculus in
determining whether to testify, downplays the resulting dilemma, asserting that a defendant's decision
"not to take the witness stand because of the risk of cross-examination" is merely "a choice of litigation
tactics." Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238; Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 757, 759-{)0 (2000)
(recognizing that the defendant must "take into account the matters which may be brought out on crossexamination" including that he "may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or the like" and stating
that "it is not thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the
defendant to weigh such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify" (quoting McGautha v. California,
402 u.s. 183,215 (1971))).
In accordance with the case law's peculiar inclination to burden only the defendant"s
testimony, the Supreme Court ruled in James v. Illinois that illegally obtained evidence cannot be used
to impeach defense witnesses other than the defendant. 493 U.S. 307, 315 (1990).
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C. Trial Courts and Prosecutors May Not Comment Adversely on a
Defendant's Refusal to TestifY
In sharp contrast to the meager protections granted to the defendant's
right to testify, the courts have been extraordinarily protective of the
right not to testify. 70 One of the most significant examples of this robust
protection is the preclusion of any adverse judicial or prosecutorial
comment on a failure to testify, a relatively recent addition to
constitutional law arising from the 1965 Supreme Court decision in
Griffin v. California. 71
The Griffin decision concerned a state murder trial at which the
defendant did not testify despite the fact that the evidence placed him in
an alley with the victim on the evening of her death. The prosecutor, in
summation, made a point of the refusal to testify in light of the
defendant's presumed knowledge of the particulars of the victim's
The
demise, including, of course, whether he murdered her. 72
prosecutor argued, "[I]n the whole world, if anybody would know, this
defendant would know" what happened to the victim, and yet he "has
not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain" the events of that
night. 73 In accordance with California law, the trial judge then
instructed the jury:
As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can
reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his
knowledge, if he does not testify ... the jury may take that failure into
consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as
indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn
74
therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the resulting conviction,
cQncluding that the prosecutor's argument as buttressed by the trial
court's instruction constituted "a penalty imposed by courts for

70. As an example of the contrasting treatment, while the Court has vigorously protected a
defendant's freedom to remain silent '"unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will,"' it has never suggested that there is a similar freedom to testifY '"unless he chooses to [remain
silent] in the unfettered -exercise-ofhis own wilL"' Carterv. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305{1981).
71. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (stating that the Fifth Amendment precludes "either comment by
the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt"). Griffin was foreshadowed by an 1893 decision, Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893),
which held that adverse comment on a defendant's failure to testifY violated a federal statute that
provided that a defendant's failure to testifY "shall not create any presumption against him." /d. at 65;
see Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613.
72. 380 U.S. at 609.
73. /d. at 611.
74. /d. at 609.
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exercising a constitutional privilege" (the right to remain silent) that
unconstitutionally "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion
costly."75 In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged that "the
inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the
accused's knowledge is ... natural and irresistible," 76 but it explained:
"What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.
What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused
into evidence against him is quite another." 77
As a result of Griffin, a prosecutor may no longer argue and a trial
court may not instruct that the defendant's refusal to testify supports any
inference of guilt, even in those circumstances where a logical inference
to that effect is "natural and irresistible" as it was in Griffin itself. By
precluding such argument and judicial comment on the grounds that it
makes assertion of the privilege "costly," the Supreme Court, by design,
rendered a defendant's silence less "costly," significantly shifting the
overall calculus regarding the decision to testify in favor of remaining
silent. 78
D. A Prosecutor May Comment on a TestifYing Defendant's
"Opportunity" to Tailor Testimony

In contrast to the curtailment of prosecutorial comment on the
defendant's failure to testify, the Supreme Court has heartily endorsed
adverse prosecutorial comment on a defendant's testimony.
A
prosecutor has, of course, always been free to highlight the defendant's
compelling motive to lie based on an abiding interest in acquittal over
conviction. 79 Prosecutors are authorized by the Court's ruling in
75. /d. at 614-15.
76. !d. Indeed, in a later case that upheld consideration of a prisoner's silence in the face of
accusation as evidence of guilt in prison disciplinary hearings, the Court emphasized that "'[s]ilence is
often evidence of the most persuasive character."' Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976)
(quoting United States ex rei. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923)). The Court also
acknowledged in that case that adverse inferences from silence are permitted in civil cases, and
attempted to explain the contrary rule in criminal cases on the ground that "[i]n criminal cases, ... the
stakes are higher and the State's sole interest is to convict." !d. at 318-19.
77. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
78. /d. Lerner, supra note 4, at 824 (highlighting Griffin decision in arguing that "Supreme
Court interpretations of our Fifth Amendment help to shield a defendant from the normal consequences
of not testifying"). The California Supreme Court had earlier recognized that allowing prosecutorial and
judicial comment on the refusal to take the stand "might encourage some defendants to testify to avoid
the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from their failure to do so" but concluded that "this
encouragement does not amount to the compulsion to testify condemned by the Fifth Amendment."
People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753,763 (Cal. 1965).
79. See Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301,304 (1895) (recognizing that a defendant's "deep
personal interest ... in the result of the suit should be considered by the jury in weighing his evidence").

HeinOnline -- 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 873 2007-2008

874

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

Portuondo v. Agard to also argue opportunity: that "a defendant's
presence in the courtroom provides him a unique opportunity to tailor
his testimony" to that of the other witnesses. 80 Specifically, the
prosecutor in Portuondo argued in summation:
You know, ladies and gentlemen, unlike all the other witnesses in
this case the defendant has a benefit and the benefit that he has, unlike all
the other witnesses, is he gets to sit here and listen to the testimony of all
the other witnesses before he testifies .... 81

The prosecutor added that this opportunity gives the defendant "a big
advantage," to "sit here and think what am I going to say and how am I
going to say it? How am I going to fit it into the evidence?"82
In approving this line of argument, the Court was not troubled that it
burdened the defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him" and to consult with counsel during trial, 83
and, as noted by the dissent, thus "transforrn[ed] a defendant's presence
at trial from a Sixth Amendment right into an automatic burden on his
credibility." 84 The majority argued instead that the prosecutor's
argument was "in accord with our longstanding rule that when a
defendant takes the stand, 'his credibility may be impeached and his
testimony assailed like that of any other witness."' 85 The majority saw
"no reason to depart from the practice of treating testifying defendants
the same as other witnesses" especially as the prosecutor's comments
forwarded "the central function of the trial, which is to discover the
truth." 86
By once again emphasizing the overriding importance to the search
for truth of impeaching the defendant's testimony, the Court in
Portuondo further decreased the value to a defendant of testifying, and
made silence more appealing by comparison.

80. 529 u.s. 61, 73 (2000).
81. !d. at 64.
82. /d.
83. See U.S. CONST. amend .. VI; Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (court order
that "prevented petitioner from consulting his attorney during a 17-hour overnight recess, when an
accused would normally confer with counsel" was unconstitutional).
84. Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
85. !d. at 69 (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958)).
86. !d. at 73. There is, of course, some cognitive dissonance in the Court's reliance on the
principle that defendants should be treated like any other witness to endorse an argument that the
defendant was '"unlike all the other witnesses."' /d. at 64.
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E. Favorable Jury Instructions For Silent Defendants

Almost twenty years after Griffin, the Court shifted the balance of
incentives further in favor of remaining silent in resolving a question
explicitly left open in that case: whether the federal constitution not only
forbids adverse comment on a defendant's silence, but actually requires
some form of favorable judicial comment. 87 In Carter v. Kentucky, the
Court answered this question in the affirmative, holding that the
Constitution required state and federal trial courts to instruct criminal
juries that they must draw "no adverse inference" from a defendant's
failure to testify. 88
Picking up on its recognition decades earlier that the inference of guilt
from a defendant's failure to testify was quite "natural," the Supreme
Court in Carter recognized that even without adverse prosecutorial or
court comment, jurors would nonetheless interpret the defendant's
silence as "'a clear confession of crime. "'89 The Court reasoned: "No
judge can prevent jurors from speculating about why a defendant stands
mute in the face of a criminal accusation, but a judge can, and must, if
requested to do so, use the unique ~ower of the jury instruction to reduce
that speculation to a minimum."9 In the Court's view, "the failure to
87. In Griffin v. California, the Court "reserve[d) decision on whether an accused can require" as
a matter of constitutional law that the jury "be instructed that his silence must be disregarded." 380 U.S.
609,615 n.6.
88. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (holding that "the Fifth Amendment requires
that a criminal trial judge must give a 'no-adverse-inference' jury instruction when requested by a
defendant to do so"). The instruction erroneously rejected by the trial court in Carter was as follows:
'"The [defendant] is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an inference
of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way."' !d. at 294.
89. !d. at 301 n.18 (recognizing that "[i]t has been almost universally thought that juries notice a
defendant's failure to testify" and this fact is '"inescapably impressed on the jury's consciousness"' and,
as the Court had previously acknowledged, the '"layman's natural first suggestion would probably be
that the resort to privilege in each instance is a clear confession of crime"' (quoting Lakeside v. Oregon,
435 U.S. 333, 340 n.IO (1978))). Carter was written by Justice Stewart, who had dissented in Griffin,
and thus, not surprisingly, echoed one of the key concerns of the Griffin dissent. Griffin, 380 U.S. at
621 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("How can it be said that the inferences drawn by a jury will be more
detrimental to a defendant under the limiting and carefully controlling language of the instruction here
involved than would result if the jury were left to roam at large with only its untutored instincts to guide
it, to draw from the defendant's silence broad inferences of guilt?"); see Carter, 450 U.S. at 301 n.7
(citing Griffin dissent); id. at 309 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that "[t]he author of the
present opinion dissented" in Griffin).
90. Carter, 450 U.S. at 303. As in Griffin, the Court's ruling was presaged by an earlier case
decided on statutory grounds, Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939). In Bruno, the Supreme
Court rejected the contention that "it is a psychological impossibility not to have a presumption arise in
the minds of jurors against an accused who fails to testify." !d. Instead, the Court decided:
Certainly, despite the vast accumulation of psychological data, we have not yet attained
that certitude about the human mind which would justify us in disregarding the will of
Congress by a dogmatic assumption that jurors, if properly admonished, neither could nor
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limit the jurors' speculation on the meaning of that silence," like the
adverse comment prohibited in Griffin, "exact[ed] an impermissible toll
on the full and free exercise of the privilege" to remain silent. 91
The decision in Carter continued the Court's modem trend of steadily
increasing the attractiveness of trial silence. While Griffin eliminated
the "costly" price that a non-testifying defendant would have to pay by
virtue of a court or prosecutor's adverse comment on the defendant's
silence, Carter created an affirmative benefit for the non-testifying
defendant, requiring the trial court to instruct the jury to disregard the
otherwise "natural" inference that silence indicates guilt. 92
F. Adverse Instructions Regarding Defendant Testimony

In contrast to the now-mandated Carter instruction that strengthens
the default position of the silent defendant, the standard instructions with
respect to a defendant's testimony undercut the default position of the
testifying defendant.
These instructions, which vary by circuit,
generally inform the jury that a defendant's testimony is to be viewed
with suspicion because of the strong incentive to testify falsely to escape
conviction. For example, one such instruction states that the defendant
"has a deep personal interest in the result of this prosecution" which
"creates, at least potentially, a motive for false testimony." 93 While
would heed the instructions of the trial court that the failure of an accused to be a witness
in his own cause "shall not create any presumption against him."
!d.

91. Carter, 450 U.S. at 305.
92. /d. at 301 n.l8; Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,319 (1976) ("Silence is often evidence
of the most persuasive character." (quoting United States ex rei. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, !5354 (1923))).
93. United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1979) (approving instruction and noting
that it consists of "the standard language used by district judges for many years"); United States v.
Dwyer, 843 F.2d 60,62 (1st Cir. 1988) (reversing for use of similar instruction that included statement
that defendant had "a strong motive to lie," while noting approval of instruction in Gleason); Nelson v.
United States, 415 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1969) (rejecting challenge to instruction that defendant has a
"very keen personal interest ... in the result of your verdict" and noting that instruction has been
"approved numerous times"); United States v. Palmere, 578 F.2d I 05, 108 (5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting
challenge to "an instruction in which the judge called the jury's attention to the fact that the defendant
had an interest in the outcome of the case"); United States v. Hill, 470 F.2d 361, 363 (1972) (approving
jury instruction that "the defendant has a vital interest in the outcome of this trial" and noting that
instruction "has been upheld on several occasions"); United States v. Saletko, 452 F.2d 193, 198 (7th
Cir. 1971) (noting growing displeasure with jury instruction but nevertheless declining to reverse for use
of the instruction); cf Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 304 (1895) (approving instruction that
defendant's "deep personal interest ... in the result of the suit should be considered by the jury in
weighing his evidence"); Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("[W]hen the
defendant does take the stand, the jury is charged to consider his interest in the outcome of the trial in
assessing his credibility.").
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some courts in recent years have expressed disapproval of such
instructions on the grounds that they are unnecessary and "falsely
undermine[] the presumption of innocence," it is by no means clear that
they have fallen out of use. 94 Further, even the courts that have
disapproved such instructions support an alternative instruction that a
proper consideration in evaluating the defendant's testimony, like that of
any witness, is the defendant's "interest, bias, or prejudice."95 These
instructions, combined with the fact that "[n]othing could be more
obvious, and less in need of mention to a jury, than the defendant's
profound interest in the verdict," undermine the incentive to provide
testimony by further devaluing the testimony should it be offered. 96
G. Increased Penalties For TestifYing Defendants

In addition to the increased trial burdens placed on a testifying
defendant in terms of additional evidence (and argument) that becomes
available to the prosecution when the defendant takes the witness stand
and adverse rather than favorable jury instructions, the defendant must
also consider an additional and significant burden that attaches when the
right to testify is exercised-the potential for an enhanced sentence upon
conviction.
Of course, like all witnesses a defendant who testifies falsely under
oath is subject to a subsequent perjury prosecution. 97 The practical

94. See United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing conviction
based on "deep personal interest" instruction and recommending instructions that treat defendant's
testimony as that of any other witness); Alexander G.P. Goldenberg, Note, Interested, but Presumed
Innocent: Rethinking Instructions on the Credibility of TestifYing Defendants, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 745, 755-762 (2007) (describing various approaches of federal circuits to instructions regarding
defendant testimony).
95. /d. at 249 n.8. A related jury instruction, approved by the federal courts, instructs jurors that
they may consider the fact that a defendant's testimony fails to explain or deny acts of an incriminating
nature. See Sisco v. Huskey, 73 Fed.Appx. 911,913 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that instruction that jury
may consider defendant's failure to explain acts of an incriminating nature "is fully consistent with
established federal law"); McGahee v. Massey, 667 F.2d 1357, 1362 (lith Cir. 1982) ("Our precedent
has made it clear 'that when a defendant voluntarily testifies to the merits, and not just upon a purely
collateral matter, the prosecutor may comment upon the defendant's failure to deny or explain
incriminating facts already in evidence."'); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 494 (1917)
(approving jury instruction that allows jury to consider testifYing defendant's failure to deny or explain
acts of an incriminating nature).
96. !d. at 248.
97. Under federal law, the crime of perjury occurs when "[a] witness testifYing under oath or
affirmation ... gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false
testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory." United States v. Dunnigan,
507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980) (noting that a defendant
"would unquestionably be subject to a perjury prosecution if he knowingly lies on cross-examination").
All witnesses in federal court must testify under oath or affirmation. FED. R. EVID. 603 ("Before
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barriers to such a prosecution in the form of a necessary expenditure of
prosecution resources in a separate trial for an offense generally viewed
as difficult to prove, make this an unlikely occurrence for any trial
witness, including the defendant. 98 Unlike any other witness, however, a
defendant who is perceived to have testified falsely is amenable to a
more realistic and immediate punishment. Under the federal sentencing
guidelines, a defendant's false testimony at trial constitutes a basis for a
recommended two-level sentencing enhancement for obstructing justice,
a codification of a generally accepted practice of enhancing a sentence
based on trial testimony perceived to be false. 99 The Supreme Court has
endorsed this sentencing practice, stating, "It is rational for a sentencing
authority to conclude that a defendant who commits a crime and then
perjures herself in an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more
threatening to society and less deserving of leniency" as compared "with
the defendant charged with the same crime who allows judicial
proceedings to progress without resorting to perjury." 100
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the contention that
punishing the accused for contesting guilt impermissibly burdens the
testif'ying, every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will testif'y truthfully, by oath or
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the
witness' mind with the duty to do so."); Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 97 ("The requirement of sworn
testimony, backed by punishment for peljury, is as much a protection for the accused as it is a threat.
All testimony, from third-party witnesses and the accused, has greater value because of the witness' oath
and the obligations or penalties attendant to it.").
98. See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1243 (2004)
(reporting that only 0.2 % of convictions in federal system and in California courts are for peljury);
Robert G. Morvillo & Christopher J. Morvillo, Untangling the Web: Defending a Perjury Case,
LITIGATION, Winter 2007, at 8, 8 (noting that in 2003, almost twice as many defendants were prosecuted
in district court for violations of migratory bird laws (167) than for peljury (88)); Stuart P. Green,
Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRJM. L. REv. 9, 42 (2005) ("Most commentators agree that
peljury and obstruction of justice occur quite commonly in our criminal justice system, though
prosecutions for such offenses are comparatively rare."); Kevin C. McMunigal & Calvin William
Sharpe, Reforming Extrinsic Impeachment, 33 CONN. L. REv. 363, 379 (2001) ("[L]awyer and witness
may nonetheless be deterred from attempting ... peljury by the possibility of a separate criminal
prosecution for peljury, though such prosecutions are rare."); Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2668
(recognizing "de facto exemption" from peljury laws usually applied to criminal defendants); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1457, 1489 (1997) ("peljury
is notoriously difficult to prove" and "the ethos of today is that peljury is commonplace-almost
expected and tolerated, it seems-from criminal defendants").
99. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3CI.I (2007) ("Obstructing or Impeding the
Administration of Justice"); Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 98 ("Upon a proper determination that the accused
has committed peljury at trial, an enhancement of sentence is required by the Sentencing Guidelines.
That requirement is consistent with our precedents and is not in contravention of the privilege of an
accused to testif'y in her own behalf."); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) (rendering
sentencing guidelines "effectively advisory"). Prior to the enactment of the sentencing guidelines, the
Supreme Court had held that a trial court could permissibly enhance a sentence based on its own finding
that the defendant testified falsely at trial. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 ( 1978).
I 00. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 97-98; see also Grayson, 438 U.S. at 54.
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right to testify. Instead, the Court asserts "[a]wareness" of the potential
for an enhanced sentence based on perceived false testimony
"realistically cannot be deemed to affect the decision of an accused but
unconvicted defendant to testify truthfully in his own behalf." 101 With
respect to the federal sentencing guideline enhancement, the Court has
also specifically (if somewhat facilely) explained that a defendant
"cannot contend that increasing her sentence because of her perjury
interferes with her right to testify, for we have held on a number of
occasions that a defendant's right to testify does not include a right to
commit perjury." 102
The Fourth Circuit decision that was reversed by the Supreme Court
in reaching the above conclusion provides a counterpoint to the Court's
reasoning. In a lengthy exposition that candidly recognized the "human
infirmities" that can subvert the criminal trial process, the Fourth Circuit
ruled that the enhancement for testimony perceived to be false
constituted "an intolerable burden upon the defendant's right to testify in
his own behalf." 103 The court stated that in light of the government's
contention that "every defendant who takes the stand and is convicted
should be given the obstruction of justice enhancement," the
"enhancement will become the commonplace punishment for a
convicted defendant who has had the audacity to deny the charges
against him." The court added, "It disturbs us that testimony by an
accused in his own defense, so basic to justice, is deemed to 'obstruct'
justice unless the accused convinces the jury." 104
Whether or not one accepts the Supreme Court's response to the
Fourth Circuit's analysis, the fact remains that it cannot be lost on
defendants-even innocent ones-that if they sit silently through the
presentation of evidence, relying on counsel to speak for them, they are
amenable to no increased penalty. In effect, trial silence, if contrasted
with an unsuccessful effort at claiming innocence through testimony,
can be predicted to result in an effective two-level decrease under the
101. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
102. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96. The Supreme Court's arguments were anticipated in the Fourth
Circuit, where that court decried "[t]he facile logic of hindsight" that "deems such disbelieved testimony
a lie" and proposes that "inasmuch as there is no right to lie, there is no harm in sanctioning it." United
States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 507 U.S. 87 (1993).
103. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 185.
104. /d. at 183; Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that a
determination of whether a defendant testified falsely constituted "an unpromising test of his prospects
for rehabilitation if guilty" and that "[t]o allow the trial judge to impose still further punishment because
he too disbelieves the defendant would needlessly discourage the accused from testifying in his own
behalf'). Justice Stewart dissenting in Grayson emphasized that the Court's holding amounted to a
conclusion that "whenever a defendant testifies in his own behalf and is found guilty, he opens himself
to the possibility of an enhanced sentence." Grayson, 438 U.S. at 56.
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sentencing guidelines, roughly equivalent to the sentencing advantage
gained by pleading guilty. 105 Thus, the fact that a testifying defendant
faces not only speculative perjury charges but also the likelihood of a
sentencing enhancement if convicted constitutes a powerful disincentive
to testify. As the Supreme Court has stated with ominous overtones for
defendants deciding whether to take the witness stand, "We have
repeatedly insisted that when defendants testify, they must testify
truthfully or suffer the consequences." 106
IV. AN ALTERNATJVE INCENTIVE SCHEME

Given the severe imbalance created by the numerous legal incentives
to remain silent and disincentives to testify described in the preceding
sections, it is not surprising that a large percentage of criminal
defendants decline to take the witness stand. 107 What is surprising is
that this legal framework, which is neither required by the Constitution
nor beneficial to the workings of criminal justice, has arisen at all.
Indeed, the only readily apparent beneficiaries of the current system are
a small subset of guilty defendants who would have no interest in
testifying under any legal regime and who are able to pool with an
artificially inflated number of innocent defendants now deterred from
testifying. 108

105. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3EI.I(a) (2007) ("Acceptance of
Responsibility"); see Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 184 n.5 (recognizing the strength of the enhancement for
false testimony, increasing the guidelines range in that case "from 41-51 to 51-63 months" and "[a]t the
highest offense levels, the increase is more drastic, from 292-365 months to 360-life").
106. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (emphasis added). In a related vein, the
Supreme Court has also held that "the right to counsel includes no right to have a lawyer who will
cooperate with planned perjury" and , in fact , "A lawyer who would so cooperate would be at risk of
prosecution for suborning perjury, and disciplinary proceedings, including suspension or disbarment."
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986); Grayson , 438 U.S. at 54 ("Counsel ethically cannot assist
his client in presenting what the anorney has reason to believe is false testimony."). Thus, defense
counsel too is faced with potential adverse consequences should the defendant testify. These
consequences are, of course, wiped away if the defendant instead exercises his right to remain silent.
Granting defense counsel an independent incentive to silence one's client is particularly significant
given that counsel is the primary mechanism for informing the defendant of the advantages and
disadvantages of testifying. Natapoff, supra note I, at 1469-70 (contending that defense counsel are the
"most immediate engine of a defendant's silence" and often operate as "professional silencers"); Lerner,
supra note 4, at 827 (reporting that in French system, the defendant is not placed under oath at trial and
"(i]t is permissible to advise the defendant to lie, and in fact defense lawyers in France sometimes
recommend it on certain points").
107. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 403, 482 (1992) (recognizing that American criminal procedural rules "often operate to
strongly discourage the defendant from taking the stand"); see also sources cited supra note I.
I 08. It has been argued that the Griffin jurisprudence actually helps juries "to distinguish the
guilty from the innocent by inducing an anti-pooling effect that enhances the credibility of innocent
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To the extent defendants are deterred from taking the witness stand by
the patchwork of rules described in the preceding section, both the
defendants and the criminal justice system suffer. Defendants suffer by
being forced to relinquish their right to speak on their own behalf. The
justice system suffers because it is deprived of the information
defendants would provide, either willingly through truthful testimony or
unwittingly through false testimony. To the extent prosecutors have an
interest that is distinct from that of the criminal justice system generally,
they too suffer because they are deprived of the chance to cross-examine
the defendant, an event that from an able prosecutor's perspective
should serve to help demonstrate guilt by revealing a guilty defendant's
lies.
In sum, there is little reason to adhere to the numerous aspects of the
current criminal trial system that not only permit but encourage an
incomplete presentation of facts to the jury. This is especially so
because this system is compelled neither by constitutional law nor
historical precedent, but would in fact be completely unrecognizable to
the drafters of the Constitution.
In light of the foregoing, this Article next presents two alternative
reforms to the status quo that would encourage more defendants to
testify by eliminating or at least limiting the artificial inducements to
remaining silent at trial. First, the Article suggests the more obvious
solution-reforming the current system by simply eliminating the legal
rules that reward defendants for remaining silent and punish them for
testifying. As these legal rules serve little purpose other than to
discourage testimony, the reform could be accomplished without any
significant collateral consequences. Second, the Article proposes a more
incremental solution that (if embraced by district courts) would
accomplish much of the intended result: a formal in limine procedure
suspects" because "the right to silence affords a guilty suspect an attractive alternative to imitating an
innocent suspect through lies." Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the
Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L . REV. 430, 433
(2000). This analysis, which narrowly focuses on the right to remain silent, is incomplete. A broader
perspective that examines both the advantages of remaining silent and disadvantages of testifying,
reveals that trial silence has been made artificially attractive to both the guilty and innocent. Further, the
resulting pooling in silence is significantly more damaging to the reliability of trial outcomes because
there are no mechanisms to distinguish innocent silence from guilty silence; silence is silence. When
guilty and innocent defendants pool by testifying, however, they can be readily distinguished through
the tools of the adversary process, e.g., cross-examination, rebuttal witnesses, etc. Cf Van Kessel, supra
note I, at 986-87 (criticizing Seidmann & Stein, supra, because "in the real word of the American
criminal process, only a very few innocents likely benefit from the general 'anti-pooling' effect of the
guilty who exercise their right to silence"); Friedman, supra note 10, at 673 (criticizing argument that
allowing character impeachment helps to sort out innocent from guilty defendants because "[i]t is by no
means clear that a guilty defendant subject to character impeachment is at all more likely than an
innocent one to stay ofT the stand because of the rule" permitting impeachment).
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whereby a criminal defendant could involve the trial court in structuring
an alternative set of legal rules designed to elicit the defendant's
testimony in a particular case. Each of these proposals is intended to
accomplish the goal of increasing the percentage of defendants who
testify without significantly altering the existing balance of power
between defendants and the prosecution.
A. Reform Alternative No. 1: Alter the Existing Framework

The most direct means of altering the status quo to encourage a
greater percentage of criminal defendants to testify is to simply
eliminate the pronounced bias in favor of trial silence that exists under
the current criminal trial framework. By decreasing the benefits that
accrue to silent defendants and eliminating the penalties that apply when
defendants testify, such a change could, in fact, reverse the existing
imbalance and induce a far greater percentage of defendants to testify.
This reform could be implemented with minimal disruption to the
overall functioning of the criminal justice system as there is a great deal
of low hanging fruit, i.e., legal rules that penalize testimony or reward
silence, or both, but that serve little other purpose. With one possible
exception (noted below), this proposal could be implemented by
enacting a new Federal Rule of Evidence consisting of the following
five subrules that would, in concert, reverse the existing anti-testimonial
bias of the rules governing criminal trials. 109
Subrule 1: Restrict impeachment of a criminal defendant's testimony
with evidence not admissible in the prosecution's case in chief.
This first subrule would eliminate the primary tactical advantage that
accompanies trial silence by making the evidence that will be admissible
at trial substantially the same whether or not the defendant testifies.
This could be accomplished in either of two ways: (i) permitting the use
of traditional impeachment-only evidence (illegally obtained evidence,
prior convictions, etc.) as substantive evidence in the prosecution's case
in chief; or (ii) prohibiting the use of such evidence altogether. Given

109. A federal rule would, of course, apply solely to federal criminal trials, but could nonetheless
be expected to serve as a model for state jurisdictions. See J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving
Criminal Jury Decision Making after the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 301, 313 (2006)
(recognizing that "the Federal Rules of Evidence ... have been the model for many states' rules of
evidence"); Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REv. 65, 121 (2008) (acknowledging
that "[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence . . . function ... as a model that advises state courts and
legislators").
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the numerous constitutional obstacles to the fonner course, 110 the latter
seems preferable.
Under the latter course, the prosecution would no longer be able to
impeach a defendant's credibility with prior convictions, eliminating the
strongest disincentive to defendant testimony. The prosecution would
also be generally precluded from using illegally obtained evidence and
items such as a defendant's suppression hearing testimony for
impeachment.
The prosecution would still be pennitted, however, to impeach the
defendant with prior convictions, illegally obtained evidence, or
analogous evidence in one narrow circumstance: if that evidence directly
contradicts a statement made by the defendant on the witness stand. For
example, if the defendant claims to have never been convicted of a
crime, the prosecution should be able to impeach that testimony with a
prior conviction; or if the defendant claims not to have been carrying
drugs when arrested, the prosecution could impeach that testimony with
drugs loca.ted in an unlawful search. 111 Apart from this narrow
circumstance, however, such evidence would remain inadmissible even
if it would serve to indirectly undennine a defendant's direct
examination testimony or impeach the defendant's general credibility as
a witness. 112
In fact, the Supreme Court had at one point similarly suggested that

II 0. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining potential that prior conviction
propensity evidence could violate due process or fair trial rights) as well as cases such as Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647, 657 (1961), that compel exclusion
of unlawfully obtained evidence in the prosecution's case in chief. See also Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (mandating exclusion of defendant's suppression hearing testimony as
evidence in prosecution's case in chief at trial).
Ill . Under this subrule, the defendant could comfortably testify to his innocence of the charged
offense without opening the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence by avoiding such statements on
direct examination. The prosecutor would then be unable under existing case law to subsequently
anempt on cross-examination to "open the door" to the inadmissible evidence by eliciting a directly
contradictory statement. See United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that "'impeachment by prior inconsistent statement may not be permined where employed as a mere
subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible"' and noting that this rule "has been
accepted in all circuits that have considered the issue" (quoting United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183,
190 (4th Cir. 1975))); United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1479 (lOth Cir. 1988) (stating that
"impeachment" is not permined where it is employed "'as a guise for submining to the jury substantive
evidence that is otherwise unavailable"' (quoting United States v. Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 868 (lOth
Cir. 1984))); United States v. Gilbert, 57 F.3d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1995) ("'[T]he government must not
knowingly elicit testimony from a witness in order to impeach him with otherwise inadmissible
testimony."' (quoting United States v. Gomez-Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553,555 (9th Cir. 1990))).
112. The provision (subrule I) would preclude the presentation of evidence such as that described
in subparts lll.A&B, supra, but would not otherwise alter the prosecution's ability to sponsor rebunal
evidence intended to undermine the defendant's factual testimony, such as a witness who could debunk
a defendant's alibi.
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impeachment, at least with respect to illegally obtained evidence, should
be limited to circumstances where the evidence impeaches a directly
contradictory statement uttered by the defendant on direct examination.
The Court justified this limitation on the ground that a defendant "must
be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby
giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence
illegall~ secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in
chief." 13 In Agnello v. United States, 114 the Court applied this principle,
holding that a defendant's testimony that he received packages of drugs
without knowing their contents and had never "seen narcotics" could not
be impeached with an illegally seized can of cocaine found in his
bedroom. 115 The reform proposed here picks up this later discarded
strand of Supreme Court case law, allowing defendants the freedom to
testify without thereby granting the prosecution license to introduce all
manner of otherwise inadmissible evidence on the heels of that
testimony.
While appearing somewhat favorable to the defense, this subrule
would do little to alter the jury's overall perception of a defendant's
testimony-the ostensible purpose of the foregone impeachment. This
is because impeachment of a testifying defendant with extrinsic
113. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (in prosecution for sale of narcotics, where
"defendant went beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and made
the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics," his testimony could be
impeached with illegally obtained evidence of heroin taken from his home and in his presence).
114. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Agnello was severely limited in later cases. See United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620,624 (1980); infra note 115 and accompanying text.
115. 269 U.S. at 29-30; Walder, 347 U.S. at 66 (recognizing that Agnello "foreshadowed, perhaps
unwittingly, the result we reach today") . The Court later rejected this path, however, retreating from any
suggestion that impeachment of a defendant was limited except by the general rules governing the
proper scope of cross-examination. The now-extant rule merely restates the constraint generally
applicable to all cross-examination-inquiry is "limited to the subject matter of the direct examination
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness." FED. R. Evm. 6ll(b). See Havens, 446 U.S. at 627
(stating that use of illegally seized evidence for impeachment is permitted whenever an inquiry
supported by that evidence is "plainly within the scope of the defendant's direct examination"); James v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1990) ("[l)n United States v. Havens, . . . the Court expanded the
exception to permit prosecutors to introduce illegally obtained evidence in order to impeach a
defendant 's 'answers to questions put to him on cross-examination that are plainly within the scope of
the defendant's direct examination."' (quoting Havens,. 446 U.S. at 627)); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 910 (1984) ("[E)vidence inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief or otherwise as
substantive evidence of guilt may be used to impeach statements made by a defendant in response to
'proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination."' (quoting
Havens, 446 U.S. at 627-28)). This limitation, in fact, attains a constitutional dimension in this context
as courts have recognized the scope of the defendant ' s Fifth Amendment waiver in taking the witness
stand to be "coextensive with the scope of relevant cross-examination." Brown v. United States, 356
U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958) (ruling that when a defendant takes the stand, "the breadth of [a defendant's
Fifth Amendment] waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination"); United States v.
Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1985) (same).
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evidence as would be excluded by this proposal is singularly
unnecessary. Unlike any other witness, "[a] testifying defendant's
credibility is impeached by his interest in the trial's outcome even before
he utters a word." 116 Not only is every defendant subject to this form of
impeachment, but the impeachment is quite powerful. Juries, who
generally have little sympathy for persons charged with crime, are well
aware that defendants have a strong incentive to shade their testimony to
favor acquittal. Consequently, the need for additional credibility
impeachment of any particular defendant's testimony is generally
minimal. 117
Further, to the extent that impeachment evidence excluded under this
proposal would influence a jury's verdict, the influence likely would be
legally improper-e.g., an inference of guilt as opposed to an inference
of non-credibility based on prior criminal conduct or illegally obtained
evidence. 118 The elimination of the potential for juries to use
116. Kainen, supra note 59, at 1313; United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238,248 (2d Cir. 2006)
("Nothing could be more obvious, and less in need of mention to a jury, than the defendant's profound
interest in the verdict."); Hornstein, supra note 46, at 62 ("[W]hatever probative value prior conviction
evidence may have on the believability of a defendant's testimony, it is likely to pale in the face of the
defendant's obvious interest in the outcome of the case, an interest that will cause the jury to be cautious
in its assessment of the defendant's testimony."); Michael E. Antonio & Nicole E. Arone, Damned If
They Do, Damned If They Don't: Jurors' Reaction to Defendant Testimony or Silence During a Capital
Trial, 89 JUDICATURE 60, 66 (2005) (reporting results of juror interviews that showed that jurors
generally view defendant testimony as not trustworthy); Dodson, supra note 46, at 49-50 ('"[T]he
defendant's credibility is already so much lower than that of the other witnesses (because it obviously is
in the defendant's self-interest to give testimony which favors his or her position) that the admission of
prior convictions does not reduce the credibility of the defendant further."' (quoting Roselle L. Wissler
& Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions When Jurors Use Prior Conviction
Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37,47 (1985))); cf Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d
242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("One need not look for prior convictions to find motivation to falsify, for
certainly that motive inheres in any case, whether or not the defendant has a prior record. What greater
incentive is there than the avoidance of conviction? We can expect jurors to be naturally wary of the
defendant's testimony, even though they may be unaware of his past conduct.").
117. As Hawaii's highest court has explained, impeachment with prior convictions is "of little real
assistance to the jury in its determination of whether the defendant's testimony as a witness is credible"
because "every criminal defendant may be under great pressure to lie" to avoid conviction. State v.
Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (Haw. 1971). "Furthermore, since the jury is presumably qualified to
determine whether or not a witness is lying from his demeanor and his reaction to probing crossexamination, there would appear to be little need for evidence of prior convictions .... " !d.; see 28
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6134 ( 1993)
("Conviction evidence offered against an accused often will have little probative value. This is because
the evidence will not add much to the jurors' evaluation of credibility since it tells them nothing they do
not already know; the defendant is an interested witness who, if guilty, probably would not hesitate to
commit another crime like perjury to save his skin."); Friedman, supra note 10, at 659 ("[A] rational
jury usually will conclude, even without character impeachment, that the accused has a strong interest in
lying and little compunction against doing so" and consequently "[c]haracter impeachment evidence is
overkill.").
118. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("The impact of criminal
convictions will often be damaging to an accused and it is admittedly difficult to restrict its impact, by
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impeachment evidence as improper evidence of substantive guilt
positive collateral effect of the proposal.

IS

a

Subrule 2: Provide that a defendant's sentence may not be enhanced
based on a fmding that he testified falsely
The second subrule would eliminate the disincentive to testifying
created by the prospect that disbelieved testimony will be used to
enhance the defendant's sentence upon conviction.
Again, the
prosecution would lose little by virtue of this provision. Trial courts
have broad sentencing discretion, and are likely to impose substantially
similar (if marginally lower) sentences, particularly in more serious
cases, even if unable to resort to a specific enhancement for perceived
false testimony. 119 The subrule would simply decouple the district
court's sentencing decision from the defendant's decision to take the
witness stand, leaving the court with numerous alternative
considerations from which to shape an appropriate sentence.
As this subrule does not preclude a defendant, like any other witness,
from being prosecuted in a subsequent perjury proceeding, the proposal
neither grants the defendant "a right to commit perjury," 120 nor does it
require the defendant to testify without being placed under oath.
Subrule 3: Prohibit jury instructions and prosecutorial comment that
single out the defendant's testimony
The third subrule would eliminate jury instructions such as those
discussed in subpart III.E, supra, that emphasize that the defendant has a
particularly powerful incentive to testify falsely. This is in line with the
current trend in the case law that suggests such instructions are

cautionary instructions, to the issue of credibility."); United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212,215 (5th Cir.
1972) (recognizing criticism that prior conviction evidence "may not always reflect directly upon
credibility, and the jury may not always have the mental discipline to consider it only for impeachment
purposes"); Dodson, supra note 46, at 31, 42-43 (reporting results of juror studies that reveal that
"jurors do use prior conviction evidence to infer criminal propensity and frequently ignore or fail to
understand limiting instructions"; "the conclusion these scientists have reached simply confirms what
lawyers, judges, and courts have known all along. Juries will use evidence of prior convictions for
impermissible purposes and a judge's limiting instruction will have little or no effect on jurors.");
Gainor, supra note 49, at 764 (questioning whether the typical jury is capable of making the distinction
called upon by cautionary instructions respecting proper use of prior convictions).
119. The sentencing judge's discretion is broader now in this respect than it was prior to United
States v. Booker, which rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory. 543 U.S.
220, 245-46 (2005).
120. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87,96 (1993).
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unnecessary and potentially unconstitutiona1. 121 Courts could still
instruct jurors that they could consider any witness's bias or interest in
evaluating the witness's testimony, as long as the defendant is not
singled out as particularly suspect. Again, enactment of this provision is
unlikely to produce any significant advantage for the defense in a
criminal case as jurors are well aware of the defendant's interest in the
outcome and need no instruction on that score. 122 Along these same
lines, this subrule would also grohibit prosecutorial argument, such as
that endorsed in Portuondo, 1 3 that focuses on defendants' unique
opportunity to observe the trial testimony and tailor their testimony to
that of the other witnesses. Such comment is again unnecessary as the
point is patently obvious and serves primarily to overpersuade the jury
by suggesting that defendant testimony should be summarily discarded.
Thus, to the extent such argument has any broad effect on criminal trials,
the effect is an undesirable one-to deter defendants from offering their
testimony at all.
Subrule 4: Permit circumscribed "adverse comment" on a defendant's
refusal to take the stand
One of the most powerful inducements to defendant silence in the
existing criminal trial system is the trial court's affirmative obligation to
neutralize the otherwise "natural" negative consequences of declining to
take the witness stand. 124 This obligation is crystallized in the trial
context in the holdings of Griffin v. California and Carter v. Kentucky,
discussed in subparts III.C, E, supra, which prohibit adverse comment
on the defendant's silence and require trial courts to instruct juries not to
consider that silence for any purpose.
A key rationale underlying the Griffin and Carter decisions is that an
inference of guilt from silence is often unwarranted because defendants
may decline to testify for tactical reasons having nothing to do with guilt
or innocence. In fact, the Supreme Court in both Griffin and Carter
specifically emphasized the possibility that an innocent defendant would
decline to testify in order to preclude the introduction of prior
convictions, a possibility that is eliminated by the proposed reforms. 125

121. See cases cited supra note 93.
122. United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Nothing could be more obvious,
and less in need of mention to a jury, than the defendant's profound interest in the verdict."); see also
sources cited supra note 116.
123. See supra Part 111.0.
124. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288,301 n.IS (1981).
125. The Griffin court stated that an inference of guilt based on a defendant's failure to testify was
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By directly undermining one of its key rationales, subrules one through
three lay the groundwork for the Griffin and Carter regime to be
revisited, and the pre-Griffin situation of "carefully circumscribed" 126
comment on a defendant's failure to testify reinstated in subrule four.
Significantly, Griffin need not be overruled to achieve this outcome, but
merely limited to the circumstances then present-where numerous
tactical considerations unknown to juries (primarily, impeachment with
prior convictions) invalidated any otherwise natural inference that a
defendant's refusal to testify indicated consciousness of guilt.
Revisiting the rule of Griffin, and its logical expansion in Carter, is also
supported by the widespread recognition of Griffin's questionable
historical and constitutional underpinnings. 127
not necessarily appropriate because "'the defendant might fear that his prior convictions will prejudice
the jury,"' and thus "another possible inference can be drawn from his refusal to take the stand."'
Griffin, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (quoting People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 763 (Cal. 1965)). In
Carter, the court again highlighted the "fear of impeachment by prior convictions" among a handful of
potential reasons unrelated to guilt that a defendant could be dissuaded from testifying. Carter, 450 U.S.
at 300 n.l5. The Court identified such impeachment as "the petitioner's fear in the present case" and
quoted extensively from the defense counsel's discussion with his client in the trial court, in which:
"Counsel ... explained to the petitioner that if he testified the Commonwealth could 'use the fact that
you have several offenses on your record ... [to] impeach your ... propensity to tell the truth .... "' and
counsel "added that in his experience this was 'a heavy thing; it is very serious, and I think juries take it
very seriously .... "' !d. at 293; Friedman, supra note 10, at 680 (arguing for elimination of rule
allowing impeachment of testifying defendants with prior convictions and recognizing that "a
consequence" of such a change may be "to cut down the main rationale underlying Griffin").
126. People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 761 (Cal. 1965).
127. Griffin was criticized immediately on the ground that adverse comment on a defendant's
silence involves no compulsion, which previous cases had held was "a necessary element of [the]
compulsory self-incrimination" prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 304 (1966); see also Griffin, 380 U.S. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court in this case
stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds . . . ."). Griffin continues to be
frowned upon by past and present Justices. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-36 (1999)
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas, J., O'Connor, J.) (criticizing Griffin as a
"wrong tum" lacking constitutional or historical support); see also Friendly, supra note 33, at 700
(1968) (arguing that Griffin "gave inadequate weight to the language of the amendment that testimony
must be 'compelled"'); cf Michael Steven Green, The Paradox of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 52 DUKE L.J. 113, 133-34 (2002)
(Fifth Amendment jurisprudence "is universally recognized to be a hopeless muddle-'an inconsistent
combination of difficult-to-justify broad rules and a hodgepodge of miscellaneous exceptions"' and
concluding that "judicial. .attempts to determine its scope in a principled fashion cannot .succeed").
While the case is not likely to be overruled, see Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 343 (no other Justice joined Justice
Thomas's dissent stating that "I would be willing to reconsider Griffin and Carter in the appropriate
case"), it is quite possible that the Justices would accept a limitation of Griffin as described above.
Indeed, since Griffin, the Court has held that a prisoner's silence in the face of accusation can be used as
evidence of guilt in prison disciplinary hearings on the ground that "[s]ilence is often evidence of the
most persuasive character," Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (quoting United States ex
ref. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923)), and in an earlier plurality opinion addressing
solely constitutional rights contained in the Fourteenth Amendment stated that:
It seems quite natural that when a defendant has opportunity to deny or explain facts and
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Comment permitted under the pre-Griffin California rule was, in its
time, sanctioned by "[t]he Model Code of Evidence, and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence," "endorsed by resolution of the American Bar
Association and the American Law Institute, and [had] the support of the
weight of scholarly opinion." 128 The rule permitted either comment or
instruction only with respect to facts that were within the defendant's
"power" to explain or deny, and did not permit the defendant's lack of
testimony to substitute for a failure of proof of any element of the
prosecutor's case. 129 These limits could be reinstated in the form of a
jury instruction analogous to that employed by the California courts
prior to Griffin. 130 Returning to a pre-Griffin world, where defendants
could not hide behind Carter's "no adverse inference" instruction and
were subject to circumscribed prosecutorial comment and judicial
instruction regarding trial silence, would go a long way toward reversing
the anti-testimonial thrust of the existing criminal trial rules by

determines not to do so, the prosecution should bring out the strength of the evidence by
commenting upon defendant's failure to explain or deny it. ... In that case a failure to
explain would point to an inability to explain.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 56 (1947); see also United States ex rei. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263
U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923) ("Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character.") As stated in
another context, despite occasional skirmishes, "[t)here is no war between the Constitution and common
sense." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,657 (1961).
128. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 622 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 337 n.5
( 1978) (recognizing that the practice disapproved in Griffin "at one time ... enjoyed the approval of the
American Law Institute and the American Bar Association" and that "instructions similar to those at
issue in Griffin had been sanctioned by the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence"); see also Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2667 (recognizing that English law currently
"authoriz[es] judges and jurors to draw ... adverse inferences" from defendant silence "in many
situations"). California's comment rule was adopted as an amendment to the California Constitution in
1934 "following studies made by the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association" and
reversed the then-existing rule that no such comment was allowed. People v. Adamson, 165 P.2d 3, 7
(Cal. 1946), ajf'd, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The amendment stated:
No person shall . . . be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against
himself ... but in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to
explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be
commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the
jury.
Modesto, 398 P.2d at 759 n.l. In applying the provision, the California courts limited the adverse
comment permitted, emphasizing that the defendant's failure to testify could, at most, support an
inference that the prosecutor's evidence on a point within the defendant's knowledge was sound, but
could not itself substitute for a failure of proof of any element of the prosecutor's case. Adamson, 165
P.2dat9-IO.
129. /d.
130. Any residual unfairness caused by altering the rule of Griffin could perhaps be mitigated by a
procedure permitting the defense to rebut an adverse inference based on a defendant's silence by
introducing evidence or argument regarding reasons consistent with innocence that the defendant
declined to testify, such as extreme nervousness, difficulty with public speaking, etc.
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resurrecting a powerful incentive to testify at trial. 131
Subrule 5: Require trial courts to ensure that a non-testifying defendant
has voluntarily and knowingly waived the right to testify
Currently, the federal system has no requirement that trial courts
insure that defendants are made aware of their right to testify. 132 By
having the court inquire into the defendant's voluntary waiver of the
right to testify, this subrule will guarantee that when defendants forego
that right they do so knowingly and voluntarily. To minimize the
number of defendants who fail to testify because of a misapprehension
of the scope of their rights, the trial court could ensure in a short, formal
colloquy that defendants who intend to remain silent at trial correctly
perceive the basic legal advantages and disadvantages of testimonye.g., impeachment with prior convictions, Griffin and Carter
protections-a colloquy that would be particularly important given the
broad changes in these tactical considerations that would result if this
Article's proposals were adopted.
B. Reform Alternative No. 2: Bargaining Around the Default Framework
Through In Limine Motions

The relatively sweeping proposals summarized in the preceding
section, while certainly the most effective method of encouraging
defendant testimony, are not the only viable means to that end. In fact, a
similar result could be achieved without any significant changes to
existing criminal trial rules. Under this alternative proposal, detailed
131. See Modesto, 398 P.2d at 763 (recognizing that pennitting comment on the defendant's
refusal to testify "might encourage some defendants to testify to avoid the inferences that may
reasonably be drawn from their failure to do so" but concluding that "this encouragement does not
amount to the compulsion to testify condemned by the Fifth Amendment").
132. See Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 58 (1st Cir. 2007) ("A lawyer plays the primary
role in advising his client of the right to testify; a trial judge is not required to apprise a defendant of his
right to testify or inquire whether he has waived it."); Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1997)
("We agree with those courts that place no general obligation on the trial court to infonn a defendant of
the right to testify and ascertain whether the defendant wishes to waive that right."); United States v.
Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 (lOth Cir. 1983) ("[T]here is no constitutional or statutory mandate that a
trial court inquire further into a defendant's decision not to testify . . . ."); Timothy P. O'Neill,
Vindicating the Defendant's Constitutional Right to TestifY at Criminal Trial: The Need for an On-theRecord Waiver, 51 U. PIIT. L. REv. 809, 839 (1990) (arguing that "[i]t is imperative that American
jurisdictions . . . institute a mechanism" requiring that defendants be infonned of their "constitutional
right to testify"). State courts do not all follow the federal law on this point. See, e.g., LaVigne v. State,
812 P.2d 217, 222 (Alaska 1991) ("[J]udges should make an on-the-record inquiry after the close of the
defendant's case, although out of the jury's hearing, into whether a nontestifying defendant understands
and voluntarily waives his right.").
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below, a defendant who would testify but for some legal rule or rules
rendering that decision too "costly" could file an in limine motion 133
seeking an exception to the implicated rule or rules that, if granted,
would result in the defendant testifying. While a rudimentary form of
such motions is already utilized to obtain a pretrial ruling on the
admissibility of prior conviction impeachment, this proposal would
significantly alter the existing motion practice in both substantive and
procedural ways.
As an initial matter, the proposed motion would be substantively
more robust than the current species of in limine motions by virtue of an
expanded scope. In filing the motion, the defense could seek to preclude
any potential impeachment-only evidence, and propose alterations to the
various other legal disincentives to testifying discussed in Part IV of this
Article. For example, the defense could seek to exclude not only
evidence of prior convictions, but also illegally seized evidence and a
portion of the defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing.
Alternatively, or additionally, the motion could condition the
presentation of the defendant's testimony on the trial court's agreement:
(i) not to consider the testimony for purposes of enhancing the
defendant's ultimate sentence (if the defendant is convicted); (ii) to rely
on a particular jury instruction regarding defendant or witness
credibility; and (iii) to preclude certain lines of prosecutorial argument
regarding defendant testimony. Of course, the more conditions the
defendant placed on the provision of trial testimony, the less likely the in
limine motion would be granted.
To maximize the efficiency of the process envisioned here, stringent
procedural requirements would also be required. First, the defendant
would be required to commit to testifying ifthe motion is granted. 134 To
133. An in limine motion is generally considered to be "any motion, whether made before or
during trial, to exclude [or admit] anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually
offered." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38,40 n.2 (1984). The term in limine simply means "[o]n or
at the threshold; at the very beginning; preliminarily." /d. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (5th
ed. 1979)).
134. There is historical precedent for such a commitment, although not in this form. Prior to the
decision in Luce, 469 U.S. 38, where the Supreme Court held that a defendant can only appeal the
admission of impeachment if he testifies, the federal appellate courts had permitted challenges to in
limine rulings even when the defendant did not testify. See United States v. Washington, 746 F.2d 104,
106 n.2 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing cases). The courts differed over whether, in such circumstances, a
defendant needed to have committed to take the stand upon a favorable ruling to preserve the challenge.
The Ninth Circuit required the defendant "by a statement of his attorney" to "establish on the record that
he will in fact take the stand and testify if his challenged prior convictions are excluded" and "outline
the nature of his testimony so that the trial court, and the reviewing court, can do the necessary
balancing contemplated in Rule 609." United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 1979) (en
bane). Other courts saw no merit in this exercise noting that "[t]he defendant incurs no risk by doing so,
because even if the court excludes the conviction, he can later decide not to testify without penalty."
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make this commitment meaningful, it should be accompanied by a
prospective waiver of the defendant's rights under Griffin and Carter, a
waiver that would take effect only if the motion is granted and the
defendant reneges on his commitment. 135 To avoid placing defendants
in a position of making potentially damaging commitments to testify
without full information, the timing of the in limine motion could be
delayed, at the defendant's election, to the conclusion of the
prosecution's case in chief.
Second, the trial court would be expected to evaluate only one such
motion in any case and, absent some showing of good cause, dispose of
subsequent motions summarily. This would encourage the defense to
make its "best offer" in an initial motion. The trial court would not,
however, be barred from soliciting further proposals from the defense or
responding to a defense motion with alternative means of inducing
testimony-in essence, "testimony bargaining."
Under the current criminal procedure framework, the district courts
arguably already possess the requisite authority to grant a motion made
in accordance with the procedures described above. District courts have
broad discretion under Rule 609 to exclude prior convictions based on
their "prejudicial effect," and can rely on a largely forgotten, but not yet
overruled, strain of case law in which one form of cognizable prejudice
is that "the jury will be left without one version of the truth." 136 Courts

United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing cases in other circuits); cf
Luce, 469 U.S. at 42 (noting that "a defendant might make a commitment to testify if his motion is
granted; but such a commitment is virtually risk free because of the difficulty of enforcing it"). The
Griffin and Carter waiver proposed here definitively answers the criticism that a defendant's
commitment to testify is a meaningless, risk-free gesture.
i35. There is no suggestion in the case law that a defendant could not knowingly waive rights
such as those embodied in Griffin and Carter. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981)
(holding that a no adverse inference request must be given only "upon proper request" by the defense);
Godinez v. Moran 509 U.S. 389, 397 n.7 (1993) (recognizing that in pleading guilty, "[a] criminal
defendant waives ... the privilege against self-incrimination"). The waiver, of course, would not bind
the trial court, nor would it (presumably) waive objections to adverse comment not based on Griffin and
Carter, such as that adverse comment in a particular case violated rights other rather than the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent at trial. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the trial court
can give a Carter instruction even over the defendant's objection. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S.
333,340-41 (1978) ("[T]he giving of such an instruction over the defendant's objection does not violate
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
136. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Or put another way, the
defendant is prejudiced by the admission of impeachment because he is consequently unable to present
his testimony. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936,941 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1967) (requiring trial court to
consider "whether the defendant's testimony is so important that he should not be forced to elect
between staying silent-risking prejudice due to the jury's going without one version of the facts-and
testifying-risking prejudice through exposure of his criminal past"). This aspect of Luck and Gordon,
survives in modern practice in the fourth factor of the ubiquitous five factor framework that governs
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can exclude other impeachment evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 on the ground that the probative value of the impeachment
is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or ... waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." 137 A court may also ground a
ruling on its "inherent authority to manage the course of trials" 138 and its
obligation to protect both the defendant's constitutional right to testify
and the jury's need to receive a full picture of the contested events. 139
Finally, courts have broad discretion as to appropriate jury instructions,
prosecutorial argument, and the factors to consider in imposing
sentence. 140 Thus, working within the trial court's existing discretionary
authority, the parties-or at least the defendant and the court--could
agree on a trial framework that would permit otherwise unavailable
evidence-the defendant's testimony-to be presented to the
factfinder. 141

Rule 609(a)(l) impeachment rulings in federal court. See, e.g., United States v. Gant, 396 F.3d 906, 909
(7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing "the importance of the defendant's testimony" to the jury as the fourth
relevant factor in considering admission of prior conviction impeachment). For analysis of the
perplexing manner in which the federal courts have distorted this factor in their recent jurisprudence,
however, see Jeffrey Bellin, supra note 49.
137. FED. R. Evm. 403.
138. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38,41 n.4 (1984) ("Although the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's
inherent authority to manage the course of trials."); cf United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1078 (6th
Cir. 1993) ("Motions in limine to exclude evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.").
Trial courts already consider in limine motions regarding matters other than impeachment with prior
convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 903 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1990) (in limine motion
seeking ruling regarding whether if defendant testified, "he could be required to try on or hold up the
clothing which was found in [a] carry-on bag" that contained cocaine); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d
1110, 1115 (1st Cir. 1989) (in limine motion seeking ruling "that, if [the defendant] took the stand,
cross-examination would be limited to the scope of his direct and questions bearing on credibility").
139. Cf United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) ("It is the manifest duty of the courts to
·vindicate [constitutional] guarantees" concerning "the production of all evidence at a criminal trial" and
"it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced.").
140. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002) (stating that district courts
"exercise their sentencing discretion through 'an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to
the kind of information [they] may consider, or the source from which it may come"' (quoting United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972))); United States v. Jennings, 487 F.3d 564, 580 (8th Cir.
2007) ("The district court has wide discretion in crafting jury instructions."); United States v. Wills, 346
F.3d 476, 491 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he district court is afforded broad discretion in controlling closing
arguments .... ").
141. Any perceived lack of authority will be mitigated somewhat by the practical difficulty for
both sides of appealing the court's ruling. The defendant will not be able to appeal an adverse ruling if
he does not testify, Luce, 469 U.S. at 43, and if he does testify, it will be difficult to show that the trial
court improperly denied the motion, since the purpose of the motion (to encourage the defendant to
testify) was ultimately vindicated. If the motion is granted over the prosecutor's objection, it will also
be difficult for the prosecutor to seek review. If the defendant is acquitted, the prosecutor will be barred
from retrying the case by double jeopardy principles, and if the defendant is convicted there is no reason

HeinOnline -- 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 893 2007-2008

894

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

Unfortunately, initial resistance to the proposed in limine procedure is
to be expected. Courts and practitioners have grown increasingly
callous to the value of hearing from defendants and are, in any event,
loathe to experiment with procedures not explicitly recognized by
existing rules. 142 Thus, even if district courts conclude they have the
authority to grant such motions, they may summarily deny them. This
could lead to sporadic and uneven application of the procedure
throughout the federal courts. Consequently, while there may not be any
requirement for specific authorization of the proposed in limine
procedure, a federal rule rendering this authorization explicit would be
advantageous.
A rule specifically authorizing the proposed procedure would also
provide an opportunity to make the prerequisites to a successful in
limine motion explicit. The new rule could include the procedural
prerequisites noted above and provide an explicit statement of the
substantive standard to be applied, for example: the motion should be
granted if the value of presenting the defendant's testimony to the
factfinder outweighs the potential impairment of the adversary process
that would result from granting the concessions requested by the
defense.
As the above standard suggests, in ruling on the motion the trial court
would weigh the value to the jury of the defendant's testimony in the
particular case against the value of the foregone impeachment and other
interests sacrificed, if any, if the defendant's conditions are accepted.
To permit the trial court to adequately weigh these factors, the defense
motion should include a general proffer of the defendant's testimony and
the court could, if necessary, hold an in camera hearing at which the
for the prosecutor to appeal. The prosecutor can appeal certain preliminary rulings, but only before "the
defendant has been put in jeopardy" (i.e., when the jury is empanelled and sworn). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (2000) (government can appeal "a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding
evidence" if it does so before "the defendant has been put in jeopardy" and if the prosecutor "certifies to
the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial
proof of a fact material in the proceeding"); United States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397,399 (4th Cir. 1985).
It is also relatively clear from existing case law that if the trial court granted a motion as
proposed here and the defendant testifies, the court could not later renege on the promises that induced
the testimony. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 197-99 (1943) (holding that where defendant
was cross-examined regarding potential uncharged crime and the court informed him that he could claim
a Fifth Amendment right not to respond, it was error to allow later prosecutorial comment on the
invocation of the privilege).
142. See Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion In Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the
Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1280-81 (1987) (noting that in the 1960s "[c]ourts began to
permit defense lawyers to use the motion in limine to ascertain and limit the scope of the prosecution's
cross-examination of the accused concerning prior convictions or arrests," but that "[t]he defense bar,
however, has had little success in persuading courts to extend the motion's applicability beyond the
preclusion of cross examination concerning the accused's prior arrests or convictions").
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defendant would present key portions of that testimony. 143 The
prosecution could respond with an opposition filing highlighting any
particular harm to the adversary process of the particular concessions
requested by the defendant, and perhaps suggesting a compromise
solution.
Trial courts will be confronted with wide variation in the "value" of
defendant testimony to the jury in particular cases. The trial court
should not, of course, attempt to discern the credibility of the testimony,
which is the prerogative of the jury; 144 rather the court should evaluate
whether the testimony provides any additional factual information that
could inform the jury's decision. The value of a defendant's testimony
would be highest in circumstances where that testimony would provide
the jury with facts otherwise missing from the evidence, or if the
defendant's testimony contradicts the facts presented by the prosecution
witnesses. On the other hand, a defendant's testimony would hold
relatively little value to the jurors if he intends to simply claim that he
was not at the scene of the crime (e.g., is the victim of mistaken identity,
or was framed by the police). In such a case, the defendant would
essentially be offering no facts to the jury other than a claim of
innocence which is implicit in the trial itself and can be fully presented
by defense counsel through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses
and the presentation of alibi witnesses. There will likely be relatively
little variance on the other side of the balance-i.e., potential damage to

143. A similar procedure was once authorized for the purpose of evaluating in limine motions
regarding prior convictions, although it has since fallen into disuse. See Gordon v. United States, 383
F.2d 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (suggesting that the trial court "have the accused take the stand in a nonjury hearing and elicit his testimony and allow cross examination before resolving" the impeachment
"issue"); United States v. Thomas, 452 F.2d 1373, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (describing Gordon hearing as
one that "required putting the defendant on the stand without the jury being present, and then holding a
hearing to elicit defendant's testimony and the proposed cross-examination prior to" the ruling on
impeachment); People v. Delgado, 32 Cal. App. 3d 242, 253 (App. 1973), overruled by People v. Rist,
545 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1976) ("[E]xcept, perhaps, where it is obvious what the defendant's testimony would
be," the "defendant should testify to his version of the facts in an in camera hearing or, in the
alternative, make an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury summarizing what his testimony
would be."). At least one court suggested such a procedure survived the enactment of Rule 609, see
United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1977) ("Rule 609(a) ... requires the court in every
case to weigh the probative value of admitting the evidence against its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, a process which, in many cases a judge may feel is impossible to accomplish conscientiously
without hearing defendant's actual testimony."), a conclusion that is supported by the Supreme Court's
ruling that a proper determination of the admissibility of impeachment under Rule 609 is not possible
without knowing "the precise nature of the defendant's testimony." Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 .
144. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986) ('"[Q]uestions of credibility, whether of a
witness or of a confession, are for the jury ... ."' (quoting Jackson v. Denno 378 U.S. 368, 386 n. 13
(1964))). It must be remembered that even if the defendant is obviously lying, and intends to testify to a
sequence of events contraverted by credible evidence, the presumably false testimony will still be of
value to the jury as it demonstrates an otherwise hidden consciousness of guilt.
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the adversary process-as the benefit to the adversary system of most of
the impeachment that may be excluded and other concessions potentially
granted to the defense in exchange for the defendant's testimony is
usually small given the inherent difficulty faced by defendants in
convincing juries to credit their testimony and the wide sentencing
discretion enjoyed by district courts. 145
Of course, defendants who succeed on the motion proposed here
obtain only the opportunity to subject their testimony to the crucible of
the adversary process, not any guarantee of success at trial. 146 A
defendant's testimony may well be the proverbial final nail in the coffin
that enables the jury to develop an abiding belief in the defendant's
guilt. Consequently in many cases, prosecutors would be well advised
not to oppose reasonable conditions requested by the defendant in return
for testimony, and the trial court would act reasonably in accepting those
conditions. 147
CONCLUSION

Demonstrating the oft-repeated maxim that "[t]here is no war between
the Constitution and common sense," 148 this nation's founders, who
"were not naive or disregardful of the interests of justice," 149 worked
comfortably within a criminal justice system that took full advantage of
the defendant as a factual resource, and where "the fundamental
safeguard for the defendant ... was not the right to remain silent, but
rather the opportunity to speak." 150 The reforms suggested here would
push the modern criminal trial system back toward these historical roots,
145. See discussion supra Part V.A.
146. The proposed in limine procedure places no added burden on defendants. Even if the motion
is denied, the defendant is simply returned to the default framework in which testimony is permitted as
long as the defendant accepts the corresponding burdens that attach to the exercise of the right to testify.
147. There is, of course, one windfall beneficiary of permitting the proposed in limine motions:
defendants who would have testified regardless of impeachment, or other potential burdens, who may
now be able to obtain some minor concessions in return for presenting their testimony. As noted above,
however, little is lost even in these cases because the value of foregone impeachment or any other
concessions obtained is generally negligible.
148. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 35 (1968) (Douglas, J.
dissenting); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 787 (1974) ("Constitutional adjudication and
common sense are not at war with each other .... ").
149. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,427 (1956).
150. Langbein, supra note 4, at 1047, 1049 ("Undergirding the criminal procedure of the early
modem trial at common law was a set of rules and practices whose purpose and effect were to oblige the
accused to respond to the charges against him."); Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2632 ("Where the Framers
of the Constitution saw an obligation to the community to speak, later judges and scholars saw a right to
refuse to cooperate in what they regarded as a poetic, inspiring contest between the individual and the
state."); see also discussion supra Pan II. A; Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 66 (2000).
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and away from a legal framework that cavalierly squanders a rich
testimonial resource (the defendant) at great cost to the search for truth
and with little benefit. Taking guidance from the discarded intuition of
the early American courts-that hearing from the defendant will
invariably illuminate, rather than darken, the path to truth-these
reforms would reverse the thrust of the existing criminal trial rules to
encourage rather than discourage defendant testimony.
The reforms are not intended to, and for the most part will not,
penalize or benefit either the prosecution or the defense. Their effect is
narrowly focused to simply increase the factual information available to
the jury in particular cases, a result that can be expected to improve the
reliability of trial outcomes on the uncontroversial principle that "the
truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all
persons ... who may seem to have knowledge of the facts ... leaving
the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the
jury . . .. "151
If we believe, as we claim, that the search for truth is best served by
subjecting all relevant testimony to "the crucible" of the adversary
system 152 and that cross-examination is the "'greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth,"' 153 there can be little principled
objection to the proposed reforms, which merely encourage defendants
to inject their testimony into the trial process by which they are to be
judged. At the very least, appellate courts and legislators should begin
to evaluate the effects of relaxing the penalties for defendant testimony
by permitting district courts, in appropriate cases, to encourage
defendants to testify by altering the default framework that all too
frequently prevents them from doing so.

151. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-50, 52, 54 (1987) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 22 (1967)); Amar & Lettow, supra note 3, at 922 (arguing in a related context that "one can
simultaneously reduce both false negatives and false positives only by bringing more infonnation into a
system" and that "[o]ur current system throws out too much information, and in the end, this hurts both
truth-seeking prosecutors and innocent defendants").
152. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983).
153. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 WIGMORE§ 1367).
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